数字时代物流企业加入汽车专利池博弈模型  

Logistics Companies in the Digital Age Join the Automotive Patent Pool Game Model

作　　者：王昕[1] 张峥[1] WANG Xin;ZHANG Zheng(School of Management,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《物流科技》2023年第17期4-7,共4页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：上海市软科学研究计划项目(22692104500)。

摘　　要：当今世界经济已然进入数字时代,专利是影响企业绩效组织能力的重要动力之一,影响企业的创新。文章探究在数字时代下物流企业加入汽车专利池的可能性,利用博弈方法来进行判断其在加入专利池时所需要考虑的因素,寻求企业间如何更好的在专利池中获取收益。结果表明:若专利池吸引标准必要专利通信企业时,各物流企业应稳定利益与成本之间的平衡,当企业由于不断创新而产生新的成本费用使其大于收益时,专利池应当适合干预补贴,以此来减少企业所受损失,从而提高企业在专利池中的创新收益。Today,the world economy has entered the digital era.Patent is one of the important driving forces affecting the performance and organization ability of enterprises,and it affects the innovation of enterprises.This paper explores the possibility of logistics enterprises to join the automobile patent pool in the digital era,uses the game method to judge the factors they need to consider when joining the patent pool,and seeks for how better enterprises can obtain profits in the patent pool.The results show that if the patent pool attract standard necessary patent communication enterprises,the logistics enterprises should stabilize the balance between interest and cost,when the enterprise through innovation and produce new cost is greater than the benefits,the patent pool should be suitable for intervention subsidies,to reduce the enterprise losses,so as to improve the enterprise innovation benefits in the patent pool.

关 键 词：物流企业 标准必要专利 演化博弈 许可人 期望收益 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]