高管外部薪酬攀比心理与企业违规行为  

The Comparison Psychology of Senior Executive External Compensation and Corporate Misconduct

作　　者：邹蓓蓓 ZOU Beibei(School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei 230601,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《管理工程师》2023年第4期52-60,共9页Management Engineer

基　　金：安徽省哲学社会科学项目(AHSKQ2020D04);安徽省社会科学创新发展研究课题(2020CX197);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72102002)。

摘　　要：文章以2009-2020年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验高管外部薪酬攀比心理对企业违规行为的影响。研究发现,高管外部薪酬攀比心理能够显著加剧企业违规行为,即高管外部薪酬攀比心理越强,企业违规倾向越大、严重程度越高;企业信息透明度能够显著抑制高管外部薪酬攀比心理与企业违规行为之间的关系;情境性分析表明,高管外部薪酬攀比心理对企业违规行为的正向关系在低货币薪酬、高持股比例或低市场化水平的企业中更为明显。研究结论不仅丰富了高管外部薪酬攀比心理与企业违规行为的相关文献,同时为高管薪酬制定以及如何规范企业违规行为提供了参考思路。This study examines the impact of the comparison psychology of senior executive external compensation on corporate misconduct using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2020.The findings are as follows:The comparison psychology of senior executive external compensation significantly exacerbates corporate misconduct.In other words,the stronger the comparison psychology of senior executive external compensation,the greater the tendency and severity of corporate misconduct.Firm transparency significantly mitigates the relationship between the comparison psychology of executive external compensation and corporate misconduct.Situational analysis suggests that the positive relationship between the comparison psychology of executive external compensation and corporate misconduct is more pronounced in firms with low monetary compensation,high ownership ratios,or low levels of marketization.The research findings not only contribute to the existing literature on the comparison psychology of executive external compensation and corporate misconduct but also provide insights for senior executive compensation design and the regulation of corporate misconduct.

关 键 词：高管外部薪酬攀比心理 企业违规行为 企业信息透明度 公司治理 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]