独立董事特征与非激励型股权激励的设计  

The Characteristics of independent Directors and the Design of Welfare Equity Incentive

作　　者：杨慧辉[1] 沈钦昱 Yang Huihui;Shen Qinyu

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学会计学院

出　　处：《管理会计研究》2023年第4期64-75,共12页MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING STUDIES

基　　金：国家社会科学基金国家社会科学基金一般项目(19BGL069)的资助。

摘　　要：鉴于我国上市公司股权激励存在沦为高管自谋福利工具或控股股东赎买工具的实际情况,结合独立董事在上市公司高管股权激励设计环节的法定义务,本文主要探讨独立董事个体特征对非激励型股权激励设计的影响。研究发现,独立董事受教育程度越高、在公司的任职年数越长、越具有财务金融背景,就越能降低通过股权激励方式的选择、股权激励行权或授予价格的操纵以及设置过低的业绩考核目标和较短的等待期(禁售期)来实现非激励型股权激励方案的设计;独立董事与股权激励对象存在学缘关系、与上市公司存在地缘关系,会加剧通过股权激励方式的选择、股权激励行权或授予价格的操纵,以及设置过低的业绩考核目标和较短的等待期(禁售期)来实现非激励型股权激励方案的设计。Based on the welfare design of managerial equity-based compensation and the legal obligation of independent directors on the managerial equity-based compensation design process,we study the impact of individual characteristics of independent directors on the welfare design of managerial equity-based compensation.This paper finds that,the independence directors with higher the education level,longer tenure,and with financial background can reduce the welfare design of managerial equity-based compensation such as choosing stock option incentive,manipulating equity incentive exercise or grant price,and setting lower the performance targets and shorter waiting period.However,if they are classmates,student,or there are geopolitical relationship between the independent directors and the management,the existing of these independent directors will increasing he welfare design of managerial equity-based compensation.

关 键 词：独立董事特征 股权激励 公司治理 非激励效应 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济] F275F832.51