双重股权结构下的投资者利益保护  

Research on the Protection of Investor Interests under Dual-class Share Structure

作　　者：宋依曼 Song Yiman(Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing 210094)

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学,江苏南京210094

出　　处：《中阿科技论坛（中英文）》2023年第8期43-47,共5页China-Arab States Science and Technology Forum

摘　　要：双重股权结构赋予创始团队特别表决权以及控制权,并能够充分发挥人力资源的价值,贯彻企业长期发展战略。但其在推动公司治理快速发展的同时也给传统的治理模式带来了挑战。文章选取九号有限公司作为研究案例,采用案例研究法探讨了双重股权结构投资者利益保护的治理机制,及其产生投资者利益保护效应的作用路径,以期给其他欲采用该结构上市的公司提供治理经验,推动完善投资者保护制度。The dual-class share structure endows the founding team with special voting rights and control,fully leverages the value of human resources and implements the long-term development strategy of enterprises.However,while promoting the rapid development of corporate governance,it also bring challenges to traditional governance models.The thesis intends to apply case study method to explore the governance mechanism of the protection of the investor interests of Ninebot Limited,as well as the path of its effect on the protection of the interests of investors,with a view to offering governance experience to other companies wishing to list with dual-class share structure,and perfecting the investor protection system.

关 键 词：双重股权结构 投资者 利益保护 九号有限公司 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]