超额商誉对企业非效率投资的影响研究——基于风险承担和融资约束的视角  

Excess Goodwill and Inefficient Investment:An Analysis Based on Risk Taking and Financing Constraints

作　　者：李秉祥[1] 孙悦 张涛涛 陶瑞[1] LI Bingxiang;SUN Yue;ZHANG Taotao;TAO Rui(School of Economics and Management,Xi’an University of Technology,Xi’an 710054,China)

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2023年第7期184-189,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71772151);陕西省社科界年度重大理论与现实问题研究项目(2021ND0258)。

摘　　要：为探究超额商誉对企业非效率投资的影响,本文基于风险承担与融资约束双视角,选取2007~2018年我国A股上市公司数据为样本,实证检验了超额商誉与非效率投资的关系及其影响机制。研究表明:超额商誉对企业非效率投资、过度投资和投资不足显著正向影响;进一步分析表明,风险承担在超额商誉与过度投资中存在部分中介作用,即超额商誉会加剧企业风险承担进而加剧其过度投资;融资约束在超额商誉与投资不足中发挥部分中介作用,即超额商誉会加剧企业融资约束进而加剧其投资不足;企业社会责任信息披露能抑制超额商誉与过度投资间正相关关系。研究结论丰富和拓展了超额商誉的经济后果、传导路径和治理措施,也为企业优化投资效率提供了靶向指导。Merger and acquisition(M&A)is an efficient and innovative way for China’s listed companies to achieve industrial innovation,enhance growth,and explore new profit growth source,which has been hot among enterprises.However,irrational mergers and acquisitions can lead to companies facing high goodwill issues,which not only make it difficult to meet excess profit expectations,but also lead to tricky challenges for acquirers.Goodwill consists of reasonable and overestimated portions,and the overestimated portion corresponds to the excess goodwill in this paper.Due to information asymmetry,principal-agent issues,and irrational factors in M&A transactions,acquirers may overestimate the post-merger synergies and thus pay high premiums in M&A,which is the case for the excess goodwill in this paper.In terms of inefficient investment,scarce resources for investment have been crowded out by excess goodwill,which can lead to the passive abandonment of high-quality investment projects and reduce investment efficiency.At the same time,excessive goodwill puts management under pressure from high expected profits and threats to jobs,and agency problems motivate them to invest inefficiently to meet excessive profit expectations and pursue self-interested motives.Therefore,the relationship between excess goodwill and inefficient investment in Chinese A-share listed companies deserves further exploration.How to avoid the negative economic consequences of excessive goodwill is also an issue that needs attention.To explore the impact of excess goodwill on inefficient investment,this paper empirically tests the relationship from the perspective of risk-taking and financing constraints,based on data from 2007 to 2018 for A-share listed companies in China.Specifically,this paper uses a multivariate regression analysis to verify the correlation between excess goodwill and inefficient investments.This paper then empirically tests the mechanism of influence between excess goodwill and inefficient investment using a Mediating Effect Test mo

关 键 词：超额商誉 非效率投资 风险承担 融资约束 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]