竞合视角下横向企业技术分享的博弈模型  

A Game Model for Horizontal Enterprise Technology Sharing from the Perspective of Competition and Cooperation

作　　者：李德龙 李友东 LI De-long;LI You-dong(School of Business Administration,Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics,Hohhot Inner Mongolia 010070,China)

机构地区：[1]内蒙古财经大学工商管理学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010070

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2023年第8期10-14,共5页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72062023);内蒙古自治区自然科学基金项目(2019MS07026,2022QN07003);内蒙古财经大学大数据应用研究协同创新中心2023年度研究课题(DY23013);内蒙古自治区高等学校创新团队发展计划项目(NMGIRT2202)。

摘　　要：在充分考虑领导者和跟随者存在市场区位差异下,构建并分析竞合视角下领导者技术分享动态博弈模型和产量决策Stackelberg博弈模型,得出{分享,购买}组合策略均衡路径和三种最优产量分配策略。研究发现:在{分享,购买}策略均衡路径中,技术分享收费上边界与跟随者自研技术水平、领导者在竞争市场投入水平负相关,技术分享收费下边界与技术垄断惩罚力度、跟随者在竞争市场投入水平正相关。此外还分析了双方总产量、跟随者产量变化率、由技术差异导致的单位成本差异等对均衡路径和最优产量分配的影响。Considering the market location differences between leaders and followers,a dynamic game model for leader technology sharing and a Stackelberg game model for production decision-making are constructed and analyzed from the perspective of competition and cooperation.The equilibrium path of(share,buy)combination strategy and three optimal production allocation strategies are obtained.It finds that,in the equilibrium path of(share,buy)strategy,the upper boundary of technology sharing charge is negatively correlated with the follower's self-developed technology level and the leader's investment level in the competitive market,and the lower boundary of technology sharing charge is positively correlated with the punishment of technology monopoly and the follower's investment level in the competitive market.It also analyzes in detail the impact of the total output of both sides,the change rate of follower output,and the unit cost difference caused by technical differences on the equilibrium path and the optimal output allocation.

关 键 词：技术分享 横向竞合 市场潜能 区位差异 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]