理学工夫论中的“敬”:自由意志与纯粹经验  

Seriousness in the Cultivation Theory of Cheng-Zhu’s Neo-Confucianism:Free Will and Pure Experience

作　　者：焦德明 Jiao Deming

机构地区：[1]江苏省社会科学院

出　　处：《江海学刊》2023年第4期62-70,255,共10页Jianghai Academic Journal

摘　　要：理学工夫论中的“敬”往往遭到陆王心学的批评,其精义隐而不彰。王阳明批评“主一”工夫本身不能进行道德判断,或逐物或看空,因而不能只讲“主心”,还需要主于天理。但“主一”本身就是心无所适的内心状态,内含了“无欲”这一修养论的基本观念,体现了消极意义的自由意志的独立性,因而不是逐物;“主一”是心的自身专一,是整体性的“纯粹经验”,通过调整注意力,借助无意识的统一作用,发挥性理自身的规范性功能,可见“敬”亦具有遵从自身立法的积极自由意义,因而不是看空。借助自由意志与纯粹经验的概念,尤其是心理学的无意识维度,可以澄清王阳明对“主一”的批评,理学工夫论中“主一之谓敬”的真义也能得到彰显。The“Seriousness”in the cultivation theory of Cheng-Zhu’s School is often criticized by Lu-Wang’s school.Wang Yangming criticized the practice of“concentration on one thing”could not carry out moral judgment by itself,so people must concentrate not only on their minds but also on the Principle of Nature.However,“concentration on one thing”itself connotes the basic concept of the cultivation theory of“no desire”,which embodies the independence of free will in the negative sense.Again,It is also the concentration of the mind on itself and the holistic“pure experience”,and it performs the normative function of the Principle of Nature by adjusting the attention of the unconscious,so it can be seen that“seriousness”also has the significance of positive freedom of self-legislation.With the help of the concepts of“free will”and“pure experience”,Wang Yangming’s criticism of“concentration on one thing”can be clarified.

关 键 词：敬 主一 自由意志 纯粹经验 无意识 

分 类 号：B248[哲学宗教—中国哲学]