财务违规背景下的机构投资者行为  

Research on the Behavior of Institutional Investors under the Background of Financial Irregularities

作　　者：吴冬晓 陈柏彤 WU Dongxiao;CHEN Baitong(College of Management,Beijing Union University,Beijing 100101)

机构地区：[1]北京联合大学管理学院,北京100101

出　　处：《经济论坛》2023年第7期126-138,共13页Economic Forum

基　　金：北京市教育委员会社科计划一般项目“基于文本挖掘技术的北京市科创企业财务违规行为研究”(SM202211417007)。

摘　　要：随着经济不断发展,机构投资者已成为我国资本市场的重要力量。从机构投资者出发,以2011—2020年A股上市公司为研究对象,探究机构投资者交叉持股与企业财务违规之间的关系。研究发现:一是交叉持股的机构投资者为保证其参与的投资组合价值最大,具有较强的参与企业决策的动机,有效降低企业财务违规行为的发生;二是机构投资者交叉持股能够约束管理者行为,促使企业披露有效的会计信息,提升企业间的会计信息可比性;三是交叉持股的机构投资者能够营造良好的会计信息可比性环境,提升企业间的会计信息可比性,进而降低企业财务违规行为的发生;四是较低的公司治理能力和较高的融资约束程度下,交叉持股的机构投资者更能发挥有效的监督作用,机构投资者交叉持股对公司财务违规行为的预防效果相比公司治理能力较强和融资约束程度较低时更显著。最后分别从企业视角和机构投资者视角提出针对性建议。With the continuous development of the economy,institutional investors have become an important force in China’s capital market.Starting from institutional investors,this paper explores the relationship between institutional investors’cross-shareholding and corporate financial irregularities by taking A-share listed compa-nies from 2011-2020 as the research object.It is found that:First,institutional investors with cross-shareholding have a strong motivation to participate in corporate decision-making to ensure the maximum value of the portfolio they participate in,which effectively reduces the occurrence of corporate financial irregularities;second,institution-al investors’cross-shareholding can restrain managers’behaviors,prompt enterprises to disclose effective ac-counting information and improve the comparability of accounting information between enterprises;third,institution-al investors with cross-shareholding can create a good environment for comparability of accounting information,en-hance the comparability of accounting information between enterprises,and thus reduce the occurrence of corporate financial irregularities;fourth,institutional investors with cross-shareholding can play a more effective supervisory role under lower corporate governance and higher financing constraints,and the preventive effect of institutional in-vestors’cross-shareholding on corporate financial irregularities is more significant than that under higher corpo-rate governance and lower financing constraints.Finally,this paper proposes recommendations from the perspective of firms and institutional investors respectively.

关 键 词：机构投资者 交叉持股 财务违规 会计可比性 

分 类 号：F279.23[经济管理—企业管理]