从博弈论视角探讨中小股东的参与对提升高管薪酬契约有效性  

Discussion on the Effectiveness of Medium and Small Shareholders'Participation in Enhancing the Executive Compensation Contract from the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：蔡晓轩 左晶晶[1] Xiaoxuan Cai;Jingjing Zuo(Business school,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai,200093,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《管理科学与研究（中英文版）》2023年第8期1-7,共7页Management Science and Research

基　　金：上海市哲学社会科学规划课题:“创业企业催化剂型组织的治理机制研究-基于人力资本动态激励相容的视角”(2020BGL026)。

摘　　要：本文从中小股东对高管监督过程中互动博弈出发,通过构建利益双方的博弈模型,利用双方的期望效用函数对博弈局中人的行为选择进行了动态分析。研究发现中小股东积极参与公司治理可以有效降低信息不对称,弥补大股东对高管监督激励不足的部分,充分发挥其监督作用,进而能够提升高管薪酬契约有效性。在中小股东对高管采取监督策略且该策略有效的条件下,最终促使博弈双方达到利益均衡;同时,提高对高管的监督效率、加大对高管在职谋私事件后的处罚力度可以降低中小股东对其监督的需求。本文研究从博弈论视角,拓展了对中小股东积极参与公司治理,进一步提升企业内部治理效率作用的认知,为完善公司内部治理提供了理论参考依据。Starting from the interactive game between small and medium shareholders and executives in the process of supervising executives,this article dynamically analyzes the behavior choices of individuals in the game by constructing a game model for the interests of both parties and using the expected utility functions of both parties.The study found that the active participation of small and medium shareholders in corporate governance can effectively reduce information asymmetry,make up for the insufficient incentive for executive supervision by major shareholders,and fully exert their supervisory role,thereby improving the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts.At the same time,small and medium shareholders can reduce the need for supervision by increasing their supervision efficiency and punishment intensity.When small and medium shareholders implement effective supervision,the interest game between executives and small and medium shareholders ultimately reaches an equilibrium state.This study expands the understanding of the positive role of small and medium shareholders in actively participating in corporate governance from the perspective of game theory,and provides a theoretical reference for improving internal corporate governance.

关 键 词：中小股东参与 高管薪酬契约有效性 薪酬监督治理 博弈论 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]