零售商双重行为偏好下双渠道供应链定价决策与协调  

Pricing Strategy and Coordination of Dual-channel Supply Chain Considering Retailer's Dual-preference

作　　者：袁宇翔 程栋 白秦洋 周支立[1] YUAN Yuxiang;CHENG Dong;BAI Qinyang;ZHOU Zhili(School of management,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an,Shaanxi 710049,China;Glorious Sun School of Business&Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2023年第3期61-70,共10页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71971168);国家自然科学基金项目(71901058);中央高校基本科研业务专项资金项目(2232018H-07)。

摘　　要：产品在线上和线下渠道的定价策略以及不同渠道之间的冲突已成为供应链企业亟需解决的问题。针对双渠道供应链中零售商不是完全理性且在决策中会同时关注公平和风险的情形,基于零售商的公平关切和风险厌恶双重行为偏好,研究了双渠道供应链的定价决策与协调问题。首先,基于制造商为Stackelberg主方,分析了零售商具有双重行为偏好下供应链成员的最优价格、需求和收益;然后,改进了双渠道下收益共享协调契约,给出了供应链达到协调时契约参数应满足的条件;最后,通过算例分析验证了协调契约的有效性。结果表明:受零售商双重行为偏好的影响,制造商为了避免自身利益受损,应该适当提高产品的批发价,同时保持线上直销价不变。An urgent problem for supply chain companies to resolve is the pricing strategies of online and offline channels,and the conflicts between different channels.In a dual-channel supply chain,retailers may not be completely rational and pay attention to fairness and risk at the same time.To address this issue,the fairness concerns and risk aversion of retailers were considered to address the pricing decision-making and coordination of a dual-channel supply chain.First,the optimal prices,demands and revenues of manufacturer-led supply chain members were analyzed when retailers have a dual-preference.Then,an improved revenue-sharing coordination contract was designed for the dual-channel supply chain.The conditions that the contract parameters should meet were given when the supply chain reaches coordination,and the effectiveness of the coordination contract was verified by a numerical example analysis.The results show that considering the impact of the dual-preference of retailers,the manufacturer should appropriately increase the wholesale price of products to avoid damage to their own interests,while the online direct sales price remains unchanged.

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 双重偏好 STACKELBERG博弈 收益共享契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]