基于三方演化博弈的应急物资物价稳定性研究  

Research on Price Stability of Emergency Supplies Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

作　　者：唐建兵 李芳[1] 施可可 TANG Jian-bing;LI Fang;SHI Ke-ke(School of Management,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2023年第8期7-12,6,共7页Logistics Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71840003,72271164);上海市软科学研究重点项目(19692104000)。

摘　　要：针对突发公共事件背景下应急物资供需不平衡时可能会导致的应急物资价格失控问题,建立博弈模型探讨能否保持应急物资价格的稳定。构建政府-供应商-消费者演化博弈模型,判定复制动态方程的均衡点达到稳定状态的条件,并在理想稳定状态下探讨各参数变化对参与方策略选择的影响。研究发现:三方之间的策略选择行为互相影响,政府和消费者的监管作用具有互补作用;政府的监管成功率、补贴力度、惩罚系数会对政府和供应商的决策行为有直接影响,对消费者的决策行为有间接影响。政府和消费者参与监管或监督供应商应急物资销售行为的效果显著。In view of the problem that the imbalance between supply and demand of emergency supplies in the context of public emergencies may lead to the uncontrolled price of emergency supplies,a game model is established to explore whether the price of emergency supplies can be kept stable.The government-supplier-consumer evolutionary game model is constructed to determine the conditions for the equilibrium point of the replication dynamic equation to reach a stable state,and the influence of each parameter change on the strategy selection of the participants is discussed under the ideal stable state.The study found that the strategic choice behavior of the three parties affects each other,and the regulatory role of the government and consumers has a complementary effect;the government's regulatory success rate,subsidy intensity and penalty coefficient will directly affect the decision-making behavior of the government and suppliers,and indirectly affect the decision-making behavior of consumers.The effect of government and consumers participating in the supervision or supervision of suppliers' emergency supplies sales is remarkable.

关 键 词：供应链 应急物资价格 演化博弈 均衡策略 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]