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作 者:王述 刘盾[1] 聂佳佳[1] WANG Shu;LIU Dun;NIE Jiajia(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)
机构地区:[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031
出 处:《系统工程》2023年第4期59-70,共12页Systems Engineering
基 金:国家自然基金资助项目(62276217,61876157,71571148,71672153);西南交通大学智慧物流与供应链管理研究生导师团队项目(YJSY-DSTD201918)。
摘 要:本文探讨了供应商的渠道选择策略问题,重点关注供应商在直销渠道上是通过设立零售分公司还是零售子公司的方式将产品销售给终端消费者。在需求信息不对称的背景下,讨论了供应商的三种渠道策略,建立了不同策略组合的六种供应链模型,并分析了供应商的渠道选择策略以及零售商的信息分享决策。研究发现:零售商不分享需求信息时,供应商对子公司持股比例并非越大越好。无论零售商是否分享需求信息,当供应商的直销渠道开通成本低于一定的阈值时,供应商开通直销渠道是有利可图的。供应商开通直销渠道的动机与单位产品生产成本呈负相关,单位产品生产成本越高,开通直销渠道的“门槛”也越高。当零售商的信息分享模式并不能改变供应商的渠道选择策略时,零售商选择不分享。若零售商能够利用自己的信息优势有效阻止供应商开通直销渠道的动机,则零售商会自愿分享其私有需求信息。此时供应商选择开通直销渠道与选择获取零售商的私有需求信息是互补策略。此外,零售商和供应商可能会陷入囚徒困境。This paper explores the channel selection strategy of supplier,focusing on whether supplier sells product to end consumers by setting up retail filiale or retail subsidiary in the direct channel.In the context of demand information asymmetry,three channel strategies of suppliers are discussed,six supply chain models with different strategy combinations are developed,and supplier's channel selection strategy as well as retailer's information sharing decisions are analyzed.It is found that the larger the supplier's shareholding in the subsidiary is not better when the retailer does not share demand information.Regardless of whether retailer share demand information,it is profitable for supplier to open direct channel when the open cost is below a certain threshold.The supplier's incentive to open direct selling channel is negatively correlated with unit production cost,and the higher cost,the higher"threshold"for opening direct selling channel.When the retailer's information sharing mode can not change the supplier's channel selection strategy,the retailer chooses not to share.If the retailer can use his\her information advantage to effectively discourage the supplier's incentive to open direct channel,the retailer will voluntarily share his\her private demand information.At this time,the supplier chooses to open direct channel and the strategy of obtaining the private demand information of the retailer is complementary strategy.In addition,the retailer and the supplier may be caught in a prisoner's dilemma.
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