董事高管责任保险是否增大了“理财诱惑”?  

Does Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance Increase the"Financial Temptation"?

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作  者:王玉 刘国庆 宋冰洁 郭一铭 YU WANG;GUOQING LIU;BINGJIE SONG;YIMING GUO

机构地区:[1]贵州财经大学会计学院 [2]贵州大学·魁北克大学,550025 [3]华南农业大学经济管理学院 [4]西南财经大学会计学院

出  处:《中国会计评论》2022年第4期559-598,共40页China Accounting Review

基  金:教育部人文社会科学基金项目“董事高管责任险对股东行为的影响研究”(21XJC630013);贵州省2021年度哲学社会科学规划项目“金融支持贵州农业高质量发展的体制机制研究”(21GZYB08)的资助。

摘  要:伴随金融供给侧改革的深入,多层次金融产品供给日益增加,然而投资者能否从金融机构身上薅到“真羊毛”却未得其解。鉴于此,本文从高管行为倾向性视角,检验了董事高管责任保险购买对企业委托理财行为的影响。研究发现,董事高管责任保险购买使高管的收益感知提升,损失感知降低,风险感知降低,进而会增大“理财诱惑”,使企业倾向于采取委托理财行为,配置高风险理财产品,并且该“诱惑”在金融关联度高的样本中更为显著。进一步的研究表明:第一,董事高管责任保险带来的“理财诱惑”源于覆盖率条款发挥的兜底效应;第二,购买董事高管责任保险的企业中,稳健型的委托理财行为对企业业绩有正向影响,激进型的委托理财行为对企业业绩有负向影响。本文建议上市公司适度购买董事高管责任保险,促进公司治理机制与董事高管责任保险的良性互动,使投资者远离理财“陷阱”。With the deepening of financial supply side reform,the supply of multi-level financial products is growing.However,it is not clear whether investors can get the benefits from financial institutions.Thus the paper examines how does directors and officers'liability insurance affect the corporate entrusted financing behavior from the perspective of executive behavior propensity.It is found that directors'and officers'liability insurance will enhance officers'benefit perception,reduce loss perception,lead to lower risk perception,and then increase the"financial temptation",making firms tend to adopt entrusted financial behavior and configure high-risk financial products.The"temptation"is more significant in the samples with high financial relevance.Further analysis shows that,1)the"financial temptation"brought by the directors'and officers'liability insurance stems from the bottom effect of the coverage clause;2)among the firms that buy the directors'and officers'liability insurance,the steady entrusted financing behavior has a positive impact on the firm's performance,while the radical entrusted financing behavior has a negative impact on the firm's performance.The paper suggests that listed firms should appropriately purchase directors'and officers'liability insurance,and construct a positive interaction between corporate governance mechanisms and directors'and officers'liability insurance,and keep investors away from financial"traps".

关 键 词:董事高管责任保险 委托理财行为 公司治理 

分 类 号:F271[经济管理—企业管理] F842.6[经济管理—国民经济] F275F832.2

 

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