中小股东网络监督与企业金融资产配置  

Network Supervision of Minority Shareholders and Corporate Financial Asset Allocation

作　　者：栾甫贵[1] 梁日新 赵康乐 LUAN Fugui;LIANG Rixin;ZHAO Kangle(School of Accounting,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070,China)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京100070

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2023年第5期3-17,共15页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“重大突发公共事件对企业持续经营能力冲击的评价与应对研究”(21BGL089);首都经济贸易大学博士研究生学术新人计划项目“重大突发公共事件下企业持续经营能力的动态评价及应对策略研究”(2022XSXR04)。

摘　　要：本文以2008—2020年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察中小股东网络监督对企业金融资产配置的影响。研究发现,中小股东网络监督显著抑制了企业金融资产配置,发挥了治理效应,并且这一治理效应通过提高媒体关注度、增加监管问询以及提高信息披露质量实现。进一步研究发现,当公司负面网络舆论较多、散户投资者较多、管理层持股比例较低以及机构投资者持股比例较低时,中小股东网络监督对企业金融资产配置的抑制作用更为明显。本研究丰富了中小股东网络监督的经济后果研究,并为完善中小投资者的保护机制,实现上市公司高质量发展提供了理论支持与经验证据。This paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020 as a sample to examine the impact of network supervision of minority shareholders on corporate financial asset allocation.It is found that the network supervision of minority shareholders significantly inhibits the allocation of financial assets of enterprises and exerts a governance effect,and this governance effect is realized by increasing media attention,increasing regulatory inquiries and improving the quality of information disclosure.It is further found that when there are more negative online public opinion,more retail investors,lower management shareholding ratio,and lower shareholding ratio of institutional investors,the inhibiting effect of network supervision of minority shareholders on corporate financial asset allocation is more obvious.This study enriches the research on the economic consequences of network supervision of minority shareholders,and provides theoretical support and empirical evidence for improving the protection mechanism of small and medium-sized investors and realizing the high-quality development of listed companies.

关 键 词：中小股东 网络监督 治理效应 金融资产配置 社交媒体 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]