意向性与“生活形式”——维特根斯坦哲学对人工智能的一个启示  

Intentionality and“The Form of Life”—The Enlightenment of Wittgenstein's Philosophy on AI

作　　者：宋珊[1] SONG Shan(School of Philosophy and Sociology,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000,China)

机构地区：[1]兰州大学哲学社会学院,甘肃兰州730000

出　　处：《东北师大学报（哲学社会科学版）》2023年第5期158-164,共7页Journal of Northeast Normal University(Philosophy and Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金西部项目(16XZX009)。

摘　　要：意向性涉及心灵和外部世界的关系,被看作认知内容的来源,人工智能经常面临缺乏意向性从而没有语义内容的指责。在维特根斯坦看来,意向性不是认知过程的本质,也不是行为的原因,它只能在语境整体中呈现,因此意向性是一种基于语境的建构。虽然维氏否认机器会像人一样思考,但其建构的思路却为AI意向性的实现提供了理论前提。我们可以基于句法建构整体性的语境和语义,并通过节点的权重来突出意向性关系。语境是人类的“生活形式”的体现,因此AI的意向性是派生性的,它只有在人类的“生活形式”中才有意义。Intentionality refers to the relationship between mind and world.It is seen as the source of cognitive content.But AI is often accused of lacking intentionality and thus has no semantic content.Wittgenstein pointed intentionality is not the essence of cognitive process or the cause of behavior.It's only presented in the whole of context.Therefore,intentionality is a construction based on the context.Although Wittgenstein denies that machines can think like humans,his method of construction provides a theoretical premise for the realization of AI's intentionality.We can construct the context and semantics based on the syntactic structure,then highlight the intentionality relationship through the weight of nodes.Context is the embodiment of human“form of life”.So the intentionality of AI is generative,and it only has meaning in the‘form of life’of humans.

关 键 词：意向性 建构 生活形式 整体性 描述 

分 类 号：TP18[自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程] B561.59[自动化与计算机技术—控制科学与工程]