管理者超额薪酬与企业双元创新  

Managers'Excess Compensation and Enterprises'Dual Innovation

作　　者：吴珊 邵剑兵[1] WU Shan;SHAO Jianbing(Business School,Liaoning University,Shenyang 110036,China)

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学商学院,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第5期36-48,共13页Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(18BGL081);辽宁大学青年科研基金(社科类)资助项目(LDQN2022006)。

摘　　要：以2011—2018年中国A股上市高新技术企业为研究对象,通过实证分析检验了管理者超额薪酬对企业双元创新的影响。研究发现:超额薪酬作为管理者权力的体现,对企业探索式创新存在显著负向影响,但对利用式创新存在显著正向影响;当股权集中度、股权制衡程度提高时,超额薪酬对探索式创新的抑制作用减弱,而对利用式创新的促进作用增强。进一步研究表明,管理者超额薪酬将提升委托代理成本,且在财务柔性较低、股价波动性较高及外部市场化程度较高时,超额薪酬对探索式创新的负向影响减弱,而对利用式创新的正向影响增强。基于管理者薪酬角度揭示了影响企业双元创新发展的内在因素,为企业合理制定并监督管理者薪酬提供了经验证据。Taking Chinese A-share listed high-tech enterprises from 2011 to 2018 as the research object,the impact of managers'excess compensation on dual innovation is explored.It is found that excess compensation,as the embodiment of managers'power,has a significant negative impact on enterprises'exploratory innovation,but a significant positive impact on their exploitative innovation.When the degree of ownership concentration and equity balance increases,the inhibitory effect of excess compensation on exploratory innovation tends to be weakened,whereas the promoting effect on exploitative innovation is enhanced.Further research shows that managers'excess compensation will increase principal-agent costs,and when the financial flexibility is low,the stock price volatility is high and the degree of external marketization is high,the negative impact of excess compensation on exploratory innovation is weakened,and the positive impact on exploitative innovation is enhanced.Based on the perspective of managers'compensation,the factors that affect the development of enterprises'dual innovation are revealed,and the empirical evidence is provided for enterprises to reasonably formulate and supervise managers'compensation.

关 键 词：双元创新 超额薪酬 股权集中度 股权制衡 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]