论康德义务论中的善人观  

On the Conception of the Good Person in Kant's Deontology

作　　者：郭鹏坤 GUO Pengkun(School of Marxism,Henan institute of Technology,Xinxiang 450003,China)

机构地区：[1]河南工学院马克思主义学院,河南新乡450003

出　　处：《河南工学院学报》2023年第4期70-75,共6页Journal of Henan Institute of Technology

摘　　要：康德的义务论中的道德主体是具有自律意志的善人。但是,人只要处于社会关系中就具有“非社会的社会性”,它使人陷入冲突之中,而要实现自律需要从思维方式的转变开始,从而实现在性格上坚守道德原则。道德基本要求是尊重人的权利,更高的要求是自我完善和促进他人的幸福。从整体推进自律者联合体即目的王国的实现,需要建立宪政国家及其联合体,以此为目的王国提供制度条件,但康德的目的王国理念摆脱不了深厚的宗教背景,且自律概念面临“欧绪弗洛问题”,且从马克思主义哲学来看,善人具有剥离特定社会关系抽象性和空洞性特征。The moral subject in Kant's deontology is a good person with autonomy will.However,as long as people are in social relations,they have"unsociable sociality",which puts them into conflict,and to realize autonomy requires to start from the change of thinking mode,so as to realize the adhere to moral principles in their character.The basic moral requirement is respect for human rights,and the higher requirement is self-improvement and promotion of the well-being of others.The realization of the kingdom of end as a whole needs the establishment of a constitutional states and their combination to provide the institutional condition for the kingdom of end,but Kant's conception of the kingdom of end cannot escape from its deep religious background,and the concept of autonomy faces the"Euthyphro Problem".and from a Marxist philosophical point of view,the good person is characterized by the abstraction and emptiness of stripping away specific social relations.

关 键 词：康德 自律 非社会的社会性 善人 

分 类 号：B820[哲学宗教—伦理学]