The Impact of Incentives on the Number of Suppliers  

作　　者：Yueqiang LIU Huajie JIANG 

机构地区：[1]School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academic of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science and Information》2023年第3期349-364,共16页系统科学与信息学报（英文）

摘　　要：In the context of adulteration by suppliers,downstream firms need to choose between incentives and regulation to ensure product quality.Studies have shown that the adulteration behavior of suppliers increases with the degree of dispersion of suppliers,that is,the number of suppliers increases.Therefore,based on the assumption that the number of suppliers impacts quality uncertainty,this paper further introduces the number of suppliers into the incentive model to investigate the relationship between supply chain dispersion,that is,the number of suppliers,social integrity,and incentive strength.The study finds that the optimal number of suppliers depends on social integrity,regulatory cost,and incentive strength.There is a positive correlation between social integrity and the number of suppliers,while regulatory costs and incentive strength have a negative correlation with the number of suppliers.That means,the higher the social integrity,the lower the regulatory cost;and the lower the incentive intensity,the more optimal suppliers can be selected.

关 键 词：agency theory the number of suppliers incentive intensity social integrity regulatory costs 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]