Optimal Advertising Strategy for a Stackelberg Framework Under an Advertising-Driven Demand  

作　　者：Xiaozhen DAI Zhenkai LOU 

机构地区：[1]School of Management,Wenzhou Business College,Wenzhou 325035,China [2]School of Management Science and Engineering,Anhui University of Technology,Maanshan 243032,China

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science and Information》2023年第3期378-389,共12页系统科学与信息学报（英文）

摘　　要：Advertising-driven demand is very common in practice.This paper considers pricing and advertising strategies issues in a two-echelon supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer.According to who undertakes the advertising expenditure,both the retailer-advertising case and the manufacturer-advertising case are analyzed under the Stackelberg framework.The crucial factor that affects the advertising strategy and the optimal profit for each participant is revealed.Furthermore,we compare profits of the two participants under different situations.It is demonstrated that both the manufacturer and the retailer gain more profits in the retailer-advertising case than those in the manufacturer-advertising case.In other words,the retailer has more incentive to advertise the product for the sake of maximizing its profit.Finally,a numerical illustration is presented to examine the change of the profit for each participant under different marginal demands and promotion degrees.

关 键 词：advertising-driven demand Stackelberg game retailer-advertising case manufacturer-advertising case pricing and advertising 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F713.8[经济管理—国民经济]