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作 者:廖爱红 卢艳秋[1] 庞立君 LIAO Ai-hong;LU Yan-qiu;PANG Li-jun(School of Management,Jilin University,Changchun 130022,China;HSBC Business School,Peking University,Shenzhen 518055,China)
机构地区:[1]吉林大学管理学院,吉林长春130022 [2]北京大学汇丰商学院,广东深圳518055
出 处:《中国管理科学》2023年第8期22-31,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助青年项目(71902045)。
摘 要:创新投入补贴和创新产品补贴是两种典型的研发补贴方式。本文以龙头带动型集群为研究背景,构建集群中领导者和追随者的两阶段博弈模型,重点讨论政府研发补贴方式和补贴对象选择对集群领导者与追随者研发投入的引导效果。研究发现:(1)高技术溢出情况下,创新投入补贴引导效果总体优于创新产品补贴;低技术溢出情况下,两种补贴方式对企业研发投入的引导效果基本一致。(2)同时对领导者和追随者进行补贴仅有可能提高追随者的研发投入积极性;如果仅对领导者或仅对追随者进行补贴,大部分情况下会提高被补贴企业研发投入积极性,同时损害未被补贴企业的研发投入积极性。(3)对高技术溢出集群进行研发补贴的促进效果总体优于对低技术溢出集群进行研发补贴的促进效果。本文对已有研发补贴政策研究从理论上进行了拓展,可为政府制定面向产业集群的补贴政策提供有益参考。Innovation input subsidy and innovation product subsidy are the two most typical R&D subsidies.The leading-driven cluster is taken as the research background,a two-stage game model involving leaders and followers in industrial clusters is constructed,and the influence of government R&D subsidy mode and subsidy object selection on enterprise R&D investment is analyzed.The results show that:(1)In the case of high technology spillover,the effect of innovation input subsidy is better than that of innovation product subsidy.In the case of low technology spillover,the effect of the two kinds of subsidies on enterprise R&D investment is basically the same.(2)If both leaders and followers are subsidized,it is only possible to increase the enthusiasm of followers for R&D investment.If subsidies are only given to leaders or only given to followers,most of the time,the R&D investment enthusiasm of subsidized enterprises will be improved,while the enthusiasm of R&D investment of non subsidized enterprises will be damaged.(3)The effect of R&D subsidies on high-tech spillover clusters is better than that on low-tech spillover clusters.This study theoretically extends the existing research on R&D subsidy policy,and provides a useful reference for the government to formulate R&D subsidy policies for industrial clusters.
关 键 词:研发补贴 龙头带动型集群 STACKELBERG博弈 技术溢出
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