论信念伦理原则中的证据主义与信念意志  

On Evidentialism and the Will to Belief in the Principle of the Ethics of Belief

作　　者：何海 肖朗 HE Hai;XIAO Lang(School of Marxism,Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Yubei 401120,Chongqing,China)

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学马克思主义学院,重庆渝北区401120

出　　处：《铜仁学院学报》2023年第5期85-95,共11页Journal of Tongren University

基　　金：西南政法大学马克思主义学院硕士研究生科研创新项目成果“克利福德与詹姆斯的信念伦理原则比较研究”(2023XZMY-002)。

摘　　要：我们应当在何种条件下相信一个信念,这是信念伦理学主要探讨的问题,哲学家克利福德和詹姆斯分别给出了“证据主义”与“信念意志”的答案。但是克利福德的“充分证据”概念和詹姆斯的“信念意志”概念均受到一定程度的误解,这些误解不仅混淆了证据主义原则的规范性与价值性论证,而且忽视了信念意志论证中的理智不胜任前提。事实上,克利福德建基于人类命运的证据主义原则虽然高扬了理智美德,但却脱离了现实,而詹姆斯捍卫宗教信仰的过激立场亦使得他对克利福德原则的批判有矫枉过正之嫌。一种调整后的詹姆斯式信念伦理立场将会是更好的选择,它既承认了证据主义原则的合理部分,又肯定了信念意志的积极作用。The main question discussed in the ethics of belief is that under what conditions should we believe a belief.The philosophers Clifford and James gave the answer to the evidentialism and the will to belief respectively.However,Clifford's concept of"sufficient evidence"and James's concept of"will to belief"are both misunderstood to a certain extent,which not only confuses the normative and value argument of the evidentialist principle,but also ignores the premise of intellectual incompetence in the argument of will to belief.In fact,Clifford's evidentialist principle based on human destiny,although it promotes the virtue of reason,is divorced from reality,and James's radical stance in defending religious belief also makes his criticism of Clifford principle overcorrect.A modified Jamesian ethical position of belief would be a better choice,acknowledging both the rational part of the evidentialist principle and the positive role of the will to belief.

关 键 词：信念伦理 证据主义 信念意志 克利福德 詹姆斯 

分 类 号：B82-067[哲学宗教—伦理学]