零售商间服务策略的动态演化博弈  

Dynamic evolutionary game of service strategy among retailers

作　　者：余得生[1] 董馨玥 YU Desheng;DONG Xinyue(School of Economics and Management,East China Jiaotong University,Nanchang 330013,Jiangxi,China)

机构地区：[1]华东交通大学经济管理学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《沈阳工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第5期451-458,共8页Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：江西省社会科学基金项目(21JL07)。

摘　　要：随着服务水平成为影响消费者选择购买渠道的重要因素,零售商间服务策略引起了广泛关注。针对服务的正、负外溢效应同时存在的情况,以博弈方有限理性为前提,运用博弈理论分析是否引入制造商监察机制两种情况下的零售商间服务策略。结果表明:无约束条件下零售商的策略只与服务提供的收益和成本有关,有约束条件下零售商行为策略选择与监督奖惩机制密切相关;合理的监督奖惩机制会大大提高零售商的积极性。据此提出完善社会监督体系、优化对零售商的服务举措、引入合理的监督和奖惩机制等对策建议,为企业服务策略选择提供管理启示。As the service level has become an important factor affecting consumer choice of purchase channels,the service strategy among retailers has attracted extensive attention.In view of the simultaneous existence of positive and negative spillover effects,the game theory is used to analyze the retailer service strategy in the two cases of introducing the monitoring mechanism of manufacturers under the premise of bounded rationality of game partners.The results show that the retailer′s strategy under unconstrained conditions is only related to the income and cost of service provision,and the retailer′s behavior strategy selection under constrained conditions is closely related to the supervision,reward and punishment mechanism;Reasonable supervision,reward and punishment mechanism will greatly improve the enthusiasm of retailers.Some countermeasures and suggestions are put forward accordingly such as improving the social supervision system,optimizing the service measures to retailers,introducing reasonable supervision and rewards and punishments mechanism,so as to provide management implications for enterprise service strategy selection.

关 键 词：零售商 服务外溢 演化博弈 动态演化 监察机制 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]