协同治理抑或合谋掏空:非控股股东网络与企业并购效率  

Coordination in governance or tunneling in collusion:Non-controlling shareholders' network and M&A efficiency

作　　者：杨金坤 傅绍正 胡国强 YANG Jinkun;FU Shaozheng;HU Guoqiang(School of Accountancy,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China;Center for Auditing and Control Research,Tianjin 300222,China)

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学会计学院,天津300222 [2]审计与控制研究中心,天津300222

出　　处：《中国软科学》2023年第7期202-214,共13页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(72202153,72002147);天津市哲学社会科学规划项目(TJGL21-035);天津市高等学校人文社会科学研究一般项目(2020SK118)。

摘　　要：实证考察非控股股东网络对企业并购效率的影响。研究发现:非控股股东网络中心度越高,并购发起可能性越低但绩效越高,支持协同治理效应假说。进一步研究发现:提高并购效率的主要是压力抵制型机构投资者网络和个人投资者网络;非控股股东网络提高了并购能力,抑制了控股股东机会主义行为;法制环境和股权结构具有调节作用。This paper investigates the impact of non-controlling shareholders' network on the MA efficiency.We find that the higher the network centrality of non-controlling shareholders,the lower the probability of launching MA,but the higher quality of MA performance,which supports the hypothesis of Coordination in Governance Effect.Further researches find that pressure resistant institutional investors ' network and individual investors ' network mainly contribute to the improvement in MA efficiency;the non-controlling shareholders' network improves the ability of MA and mitigates the opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders;the legal environment and ownership structure have the moderating effect.

关 键 词：非控股股东 股东网络 协同治理 合谋掏空 并购效率 

分 类 号：F270.3[经济管理—企业管理]