财政分权、纵向财政失衡与地方政府横向税收竞争  

Fiscal Decentralization,Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Horizontal Tax Competition of Local Governments

作　　者：刘卓轩 钟海 Liu Zhuoxuan;Zhong Hai(China Institute of Public Finance and Policy,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学中国公共财政与政策研究院,北京100081

出　　处：《统计与决策》2023年第19期147-152,共6页Statistics & Decision

基　　金：北京高校“双一流”建设资金资助项目(023259320006)。

摘　　要：基于中国式财政分权体制下的政府间关系,文章使用空间统计方法考察了地方政府间横向税收竞争在整体空间集聚和局部区域分化等方面的特征,在此基础之上,构建不同时期下的空间计量模型探究政府财政结构对于税收竞争的时空影响。研究发现,地方政府在地理和经济空间下均存在“向上竞争”的特点,收支分权及财政自主度不同程度地促进了地方政府税收竞争水平的提高且表现出时期延伸性;纵向财政失衡则起抑制作用,但财政自主度和收支分权分别加剧和削弱了该影响。进一步地,本文使用多门槛模型考察了财政结构对于税收竞争的非线性影响,结果显示,纵向财政失衡对于税收竞争的作用在收支分权和财政自主度下分别表现为单一和双重门槛特征,在收支分权门槛下始终起抑制作用,但逐级削弱;在财政自主度门槛下则经历了“明显促进—影响不明显—明显抑制”的跳跃过程。Based on the inter-governmental relationship under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system,this paper uses spatial statistical methods to investigate the characteristics of horizontal tax competition among local governments in terms of overall spatial agglomeration and local regional differentiation,etc.On this basis,spatial econometric models are constructed in different periods to explore the spatiotemporal impact of government fiscal structure on tax competition.The results are as follows:Local governments have the characteristics of“upward competition”in both geographical and economic space.Decentralization of revenue and expenditure and fiscal autonomy promote the improvement of local government tax competition level to different degrees and show period extension.Vertical fiscal imbalance inhibits this effect,but fiscal autonomy and revenue and expendi⁃ture decentralization aggravate and weaken this effect,respectively.Furthermore,the paper uses the multi-threshold model to in⁃vestigate the non-linear effects of fiscal structure on tax competition.The results show that the effect of vertical fiscal imbalance on tax competition is characterized by single and double thresholds under revenue and expenditure decentralization and fiscal au⁃tonomy,respectively.Under revenue and expenditure decentralization threshold,it always has a restraining effect,but gradually weakens.Under the threshold of financial autonomy,it experiences a jump process of“obvious promotion—no obvious influ⁃ence—obvious inhibition”.

关 键 词：财政分权 纵向财政失衡 税收竞争 空间互动 门槛效应 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]