组织行为范式下小型农田水利的资金供给新机制  

A New Fund Supply Mechanism of Small-scale Irrigation and Water Conservancy Under the Paradigm of Organizational Behavior

作　　者：许朗[1] 张艳玲 陈杰 XU Lang;ZHANG Yan-ling;CHEN Jie(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing Agricultural University,Nanjing 210095,China;School of Economicsand Trade,Henan University of Technology,Zhengzhou 450001,China)

机构地区：[1]南京农业大学经济管理学院,南京210095 [2]河南工业大学经济贸易学院,郑州450001

出　　处：《节水灌溉》2023年第10期43-48,共6页Water Saving Irrigation

基　　金：国家自科基金面上项目“农业水价综合改革背景下节水效应与粮食生产影响研究——基于不同经营规模农业生产主体适应性行为差异”(71973065)。

摘　　要：运用博弈论对中国小型农田水利设施建设资金供给主体的行为逻辑进行分析,探究当前中国小型农田水利设施建设资金供给困境的主要成因:一是各个供给主体追求的目标存在冲突,二是地方政府与农户进行小农水设施建设时的成本大于收益。在此基础上,依据组织行为学的激励→行为→目标范式,构建一种新型资金供给机制,提出“使用权按资分配”和“水利补贴”的激励机制,让产权激励经组织传导至个人,并给予具体实施建议。This paper uses game theory to analyze the behavior logic of the main actors in the construction of small-scale farmland water conservancy facilities in China,and to investigate the main causes of the current dilemma in the construction of small-scale farmland water conservancy facilities in China:first,the goals pursued by the main actors conflict with each other,and second,the cost of small-scale farmland water conservancy facilities construction by local governments and farmers outweighs the benefits.Based on this,we propose a new funding mechanism based on the incentive-behavior-goal paradigm of organizational behavior,and propose the incentive mechanisms of"capital-based allocation of use rights"and"water subsidies",so that the property rights incentive can be transferred from the organization to the individual,and give specific recommendations for implementation.

关 键 词：小型农田水利设施 供给机制 博弈分析 组织行为学 

分 类 号：S27[农业科学—农业水土工程]