企业数字化扩散的政策激励机制研究——基于复杂网络演化博弈模型  

Policy Incentives for Digital Diffusion of Enterprises:Based on Complex Network Evolutionary Game Model

作　　者：杨水根 何松涛 YANG Shui-gen;HE Song-tao(School of Economics and Trade,Hunan University of Technology and Business,Changsha 410205)

机构地区：[1]湖南工商大学经济与贸易学院,长沙410205

出　　处：《软科学》2023年第9期8-16,共9页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(22QZD051);湖南省自然科学基金面上项目(2021JJ30200);湖南省教育厅科学研究重点项目(22A0451);湖南省研究生科研创新项目(CX20211118)。

摘　　要：基于复杂网络演化博弈模型,通过数值仿真分析了数字化补贴比例和高新认证影响力对企业数字化扩散广度的动态影响。结果表明:数字化补贴比例、高新认证影响力等干预政策能有效促进企业数字化扩散,且前者边际效用递增、后者边际效用先递增后递减;数字化补贴比例、高新认证影响力对于企业数字化扩散的促进作用受产业类型、数字化效能以及投入成本影响;在倾向于选择具有较大社会影响力的企业学习环境中,高新认证影响力对企业数字化扩散的促进作用较数字化补贴政策更为有效;企业绝对理性或决策噪声过高均不利于政策干预企业数字化扩散。最后,提出因产施策、畅通市场信息渠道、多种产业政策配套组合等政策建议。Based on a complex network evolutionary game model,this paper uses numerical simulation to analyze the dynamic effects of digital subsidy ratio and high-tech certification influence on the breadth of digital diffusion of enterprises.The results show that,first,the intervention policies of digital subsidy and high-tech certification can effectively promote the digital diffusion of enterprises,and the former has increasing marginal utility,while the latter has increasing and decreasing marginal utility.Second,the promotion effect of the digital subsidy ratio and high-tech certification influence on enterprise digital diffusion is affected by the type of industry,digital effectiveness,and input cost.Third,in a learning environment that tends to select companies with greater social influence,the promotion effect of high-tech certification influence on digital diffusion is more effective than that of digital subsidy policies.Forth,neither absolute rationality nor excessive decision noise is conducive to policy intervention in digital diffusion.Finally,policy suggestions are put forward,such as tailor-made policies based on industries,smooth market information channels,and combinations of industrial policies.

关 键 词：复杂网络演化博弈 数字化补贴比例 高新认证影响力 企业数字化 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]