康德的先验自我能否被功能主义式地解读  

Can Kant’s Transcendental Self Be Interpreted in Terms of Functionalism?

作　　者：徐秋实 Xu Qiushi

机构地区：[1]中山大学哲学系,广东广州510275

出　　处：《学术研究》2023年第10期28-34,177,共8页Academic Research

基　　金：中山大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(22qntd6602)资助。

摘　　要：受当代心灵哲学的影响,近年来,一些学者利用流行的功能主义观点来解读康德的先验自我。其实,论证即使在康德的理论哲学中,先验自我也要被视为有绝对自发性,所以需预设本体与现相的区分,而功能主义因与康德的先验观念论迥异的形而上学背景无法解释先验自我的这种特性,因此以克切和布鲁克为代表的对先验自我的功能主义式解读是不合理的。Influenced by the contemporary philosophy of mind,some scholars in recent years have used the popular functionalist view to interpret Kant’s transcendental self.This paper attempts to argue that even in Kant’s theoretical philosophy,the transcendental self is to be regarded as having absolute spontaneity and therefore needs to presuppose the distinction between noumena and phenomena,and that functionalism cannot explain this characteristic of the transcendental self due to its metaphysical background which is essentially different from Kant’s transcendentalidealism,and therefore the functionalist reading of the transcendental self represented by Kitcher and Brook is not justified.

关 键 词：康德 先验自我 功能主义 自发性 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学] B08