国企高质量发展目标下混改股权制衡与过度投资关系研究  

A Study on the Relationship between Balance of Mixed-ownership Equity andOver-investment of State-owned Enterprises in the High-quality Development Goals

作　　者：张杨[1] 宋林[2] 刘宜琳 ZHANG Yang;SONG Lin;LIU Yilin(School of Economics and Finance,Xi’an International Studies University,Xi’an 710128,China;School of Economics and Finance,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an 710061,China;Xi’an Branch,Bank of Beijing,Xi’an 710061,China)

机构地区：[1]西安外国语大学经济金融学院,陕西西安710128 [2]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061 [3]北京银行西安分行,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《统计与信息论坛》2023年第11期118-128,共11页Journal of Statistics and Information

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“‘一带一路’贸易驱动下西部地区跨境物流枢纽网络重构研究”(20BGL282);陕西省社会科学基金项目“创新链驱动下陕西制造业高质量发展的路径研究”(2021D039);陕西省自然科学基础研究计划项目“全国统一大市场下陕西绿色金融适度性赋能高耗能企业绿色创新的传导机制与优化路径研究”(2023-JC-QN-0782);西安市社会科学规划基金“秦创原背景下‘双链融合’驱动西安制造业企业高质量发展的研究”(22JX145)。

摘　　要：股权结构是反映公司内部治理问题的重要突破口,有效的公司治理机制可以通过管理层持股来缓解过度投资。将在中国A股上市的国有控股企业作为样本,以过度投资为切入点,实证检验混合所有制改革过程中股权制衡所扮演的角色。研究发现:国有控股上市公司的股权制衡对股权集中起到明显的制衡作用,同时缓解了过度投资,国有制衡股东会纵容过度投资,而民营和外资制衡股东可缓解过度投资,管理层持股能够正向调节股权制衡与过度投资之间的关系,即在股权制衡约束下,管理层持股比例越高国有企业对过度投资的缓解效应越好。研究结论对于探索新发展格局下如何安排股权结构、深化混合所有制改革、实现经济高质量发展具有积极的理论与实践意义。The ownership structure is an important breakthrough to reflect the internal governance issues of a company.An effective corporate governance mechanism can alleviate excessive investment through management shareholding.Using data from A-share listed companies as a research sample,a series of issues are examined again from a high-quality perspective,such as whether the reform of mixed-ownership checks and balances has played a governance role in the excessive investment behavior of state-owned enterprises,and how management shareholding arrangements make the governance role optimal.This article attempts to make some new explorations from the theoretical,methodological,and application levels.At the theoretical level,using managerial ownership as an adjusting variable,conducting empirical research around the impact of equity checks and balances on corporate over-investment,further enriching the theoretical research on the factors affecting mixed ownership;At the methodological level,based on a quantitative analysis of the regulatory role of managerial ownership in the impact of equity checks and balances on over-investment,a fixed effect nonlinear model is introduced to explore the nonlinear impact of managerial ownership on over-investment,indicating that as the proportion of managerial ownership increases,more over-investment will occur.At the application level,based on the empirical analysis results,relevant countermeasures and suggestions for differentiated regulation and classified policy implementation are proposed,which can provide some reference for expanding the path of mixed ownership reform.The findings are as follows:Firstly,there is a positive U-shaped relationship between equity concentration and over-investment in state-owned listed companies;Secondly,the equity checks and balances of state-owned listed companies have a significant balancing effect on equity concentration,easing excessive investment;Thirdly,state-owned balancing shareholders will condone excessive investment,while private and foreign

关 键 词：国有企业 混合所有制 股权制衡 过度投资 管理层持股 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]