自恋的董事长更可能违规吗?——来自中国上市企业的经验证据  被引量:1

Is narcissistic chairman more likely to commit corporate fraud?Evidence from Chinese listed firms

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作  者:宁博[1] 戴亦一[1] 蒋敏 NING Bo;DAI Yi-yi;JIANG Min(School of Management,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China)

机构地区:[1]厦门大学管理学院,厦门361005

出  处:《管理科学学报》2023年第8期16-34,共19页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基  金:教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(21YJC630102);国家自然科学基金资助重大项目(71790601);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71972160)。

摘  要:基于2007年—2017年中国A股上市公司的数据,以董事长签名大小测度其自恋程度,实证检验董事长的自恋程度对公司违规的影响并揭示其内在影响机理.结果显示,自恋的董事长显著提高了公司违规的可能性和违规严重程度;并且发现,自恋的董事长精力更加分散、更倾向于构建易于控制的年轻管理团队以及偏好以通讯形式召开董事会会议是形成前述影响的三条潜在机制.进一步的研究还发现,当董事长面临较大的业绩压力,或者公司较少被分析师关注时,董事长自恋对公司违规的正向影响更为明显.本文打开了高管自恋影响公司治理的内在机制“黑箱”,丰富了高阶梯队理论相关的学术认知,为新时代进一步优化我国证券市场监管机制提供了有益的政策参考.Based on data from Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2017,this paper empirically examines the influence of the chairman's narcissism,measured by the size of the chairman's signature,on corporate fraud and the internal impact mechanism.The results show that narcissistic chairman increases the likelihood as well as the severity of committing frauds in the company.There are three channels through which the chairman's narcissism increases corporate fraud:A more distracted character,more inclination to build a young management team that is easy to control,and more preference for teleconference over on-the-spot board meetings.Further,the effect is more pronounced for firms with greater performance pressure and less analyst attention.The paper opens the black box of executive narcissism by showing how narcissistic chairman is more likely to commit fraud.The paper also contributes to the academic understanding related to the Upper Echelons Theory.These findings have implications for the improvement and optimization of the regulation system in Chinese securities market in the new era.

关 键 词:董事长 自恋 公司违规 

分 类 号:F272[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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