“烧钱”行为与新经济企业的公司治理制度设计  

The"Burning Money"Behavior and the Corporate Governance System Design of New Economy Enterprises

作　　者：郑志刚[1,2] 金天 张浩 黄继承[1] ZHENG Zhigang;JIN Tian;HUANG Jicheng;ZHANG Hao(Renmin University of China,100872;Capital University of Economics and Business,100070)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院 [2]中国人民大学中国财政金融政策研究中心 [3]首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院,100872

出　　处：《财贸经济》2023年第10期57-72,共16页Finance & Trade Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“新经济企业的公司治理制度设计研究”(72172150);国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目“数字经济时代下CVC信息不对称治理与劳动和资本合作模式设计研究”(72302163)。

摘　　要：为寻求市场快速扩张和业务模式加速成熟,新经济企业在外部融资推动下表现出独特的“烧钱”行为。这一内嵌于新经济企业的典型特征带来区别于传统企业的“蜘蛛状”现金流分布,以及特殊且复杂的权益融资结构,引发了本文对于“投资能否按时收回并取得合理回报”的公司治理问题的担心。本文以2009—2021年上市的美国中概股企业为例,实证检验“烧钱”行为对新经济企业公司治理制度设计的影响。研究发现,存在“烧钱”行为的新经济企业在上市时更倾向于采用双重股权结构,并通过创业团队成员兼任董事长或CEO形成控制权配置权重向创业团队倾斜的制度安排;而放弃部分控制权的外部投资者以签署具有董事安排限制条款的股东协议谋求控制权倾斜风险下的自我保护。由此上述兼顾创业团队和外部投资者利益的制度设计实现了新经济企业公司治理在创新鼓励与权益保护二者之间的平衡。本文的研究将为新经济企业的公司治理制度设计和上市制度改革带来积极的启发。In order to seek rapid market expansion and accelerate the business model to mature,new economy enterprises would seek external financing,""burn money"and spend beyond their means,a behavior that is hard for traditional enterprises to understand.As a typical characteristic of new economy enterprises,"burning money"brings about a"spider"structure of cash flow distribution and thus an unconventional change in the financing pattern different from that of traditional enterprises.It raises corporate governance concerns about whether the investment can be recovered on time and with reasonable returns.We used the China Concepts Stocks data of US-listed Chinese firms from 2009 to 2021 to empirically examine the influence of"burning money"behavior on the design of corporate governance system in new economy enterprises.The study finds that new economy enterprises that have raised multiple rounds of financing before IPO and are known for""burning money"tend to choose the control rights arrangement that tilts toward the founding team.They are more likely to go public with dual-class share structures,with founding members serving as both chairman and CEO.The external investors who give up some control rights would seek to protect themselves from the risk of control tilt by signing the shareholder agreement with the restriction clause of directors'arrangement.By taking into account the interests of the founding team and external investors,the design of corporate governance system strikes a balance between innovation incentivizing and rights protection in corporate governance of new economy enterprises.The conclusion of our research has the following three contributions.First,this paper systematically demonstrates the internal logic of"burning money"behavior of new economy enterprises,whichare different from traditional enterprises.On this basis,through the analysis of cash flow distribution and equity financing structure,this paper is among the first to reveal the unique corporate governance problems facing the moneyburning ne

关 键 词：新经济企业 公司治理制度设计 “烧钱”行为 控制权配置权重倾斜 投资者权益保护 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]