机构投资者抱团与企业金融资产动态配置:“监督”抑或“合谋”?  

Institutional Investor Group and Dynamic Allocation of Corporate Financial Assets:“Supervision”or“Collusion”?

作　　者：邵剑兵[1] 李娜[1] SHAO Jian-bing;LI Na(Business School of Economics Department,Liaoning University,Shenyang,Liaoning,110036,China)

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学经济学部商学院,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《经济管理》2023年第9期122-144,共23页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“大数据情境下国有企业高管层激励与监管动态耦合研究”(18BGL081);辽宁大学学术型研究生科研创新项目“共同机构所有权与实体企业金融化:协同治理还是竞争合谋”(21GIP004)。

摘　　要：金融资产的收敛速度反映了企业金融资产动态配置的效果,机构投资者团体作为企业金融决策的重要参与者,对金融资产收敛速度发挥何种作用尚未明确。本文选取2007—2020年沪深A股上市公司数据,利用Python运行Louvain算法和Bron⁃Kerbosch算法识别并计算机构投资者抱团持股比例,探究机构投资者抱团对金融资产收敛速度的作用。结果表明,金融资产动态配置过程中存在“最优值”,机构投资者抱团对金融资产收敛速度产生倒U型调节作用。在进行稳健性检验与内生性检验后,结论依然成立。机制检验表明,机构投资者抱团影响了金融资产配置过程中的成本以及决策者配置金融资产的意愿,进而作用于金融资产收敛速度。效应识别表明,机构投资者抱团持股比例适度时,发挥了有效监督效应;持股比例过大时,发挥了合谋效应,排除了过度监督效应存在的可能性。进一步检验可知,在非国有、投机以及庞氏融资型企业中,机构投资者抱团对金融资产收敛速度作用更明显;机构投资者抱团的治理效应在专注型机构投资者团体中、金融市场信息不对称程度高时作用更强;适度规模的机构投资者抱团能加快企业金融资产收敛速度,进而提升企业未来主业业绩以及外部资本市场稳定性。本文的结论为理解机构投资者抱团的治理效应,治理企业“过度金融化”问题以及为金融资产动态配置的研究提供了新的视角。This paper selects the data of A⁃share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2020 to explore the effect of institutional investor clustering on the dynamic allocation of financial assets.Python is used to run the Louvain algorithm and Bron⁃Kerbosch algorithm to identify institutional investor clustering and calculate the proportion of institutional investor clustering.At the shareholder level,only studies have explored static financial asset allocation based on controlling shareholders,individual institutional investors and institutional investor networks.This paper argues that,compared with individual institutional investors and institutional investor networks,institutional investors group uses social network algorithm to identify the network participants of spontaneous clusters in the network,which reflects the pre⁃motivation of their participation in the governance process.As a more closely connected group,institutional investor group is a deeper governance behavior based on institutional investor network,with stronger governance motivation and ability.As an important participant in financial decision⁃making,whether institutional investors can exert their subjective initiative in the dynamic allocation of corporate financial assets is the main issue explored in this paper.The results show that there is an“optimal value”in the process of allocating financial assets,and institutional investors have an“inverted U⁃shaped”moderating effect on the Rate of convergence of financial assets.After conducting robustness and endogeneity tests,this conclusion still holds.The mechanism test shows that institutional investorscollusion affects the cost in the process of financial asset allocation and the willingness of decision makers to allocate financial assets,which in turn affects the Rate of convergence of financial assets.The identification of the effect indicates that when the proportion of institutional investors holding shares in groups is moderate,it exerts an“effective supervisio

关 键 词：机构投资者抱团 金融资产收敛速度 监督效应 合谋效应 金融市场信 息不对称 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]