基于前景理论的个人碳账户推进机制演化研究  

Research on the Evolution of Personal Carbon AccountPromotion Mechanism Based on Prospect Theory

作　　者：杨城锟 李林[1] YANG Chengkun;LI Lin(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China;不详)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2023年第5期725-731,共7页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

摘　　要：我国个人碳账户建设正处于起步阶段,为了促进消费端碳减排和个人碳账户推广,基于前景理论,构建以政府、金融机构和消费者为主体的三方演化博弈模型,通过复制动态方程和李雅普诺夫第一法分析三方参与主体的策略演化路径,利用Matlab软件对模型进行数据仿真实验和敏感性分析。实验结果表明:政府和金融机构的初始意愿都会对消费者的低碳消费行为选择造成影响;政府对消费者和金融机构的补贴能够促进个人碳账户前期的发展与推进;消费者的低碳策略概率与其低碳消费成本负相关,与消费者从金融机构处获得的低碳收益正相关。The construction of personal carbon account is in the start-up stage in China.In order to promote consumption-side carbon emission reduction and the promotion of personal carbon account,a three-way evolutionary game model of government,financial institutions and consumers was established based on prospect theory.By using the replication dynamic equations and Lyapunov′s first method,the strategy evolution path of the three participants was analyzed,and MATLAB software was used to simulate the data and analyze the sensitivity of the model.The results showed that the initial willingness of government and financial institutions can affect the choice of low-carbon consumption behavior of consumers.Government subsidies to consumers and financial institutions can promote the development and promotion of personal carbon accounts in the early stage.Meanwhile,the probability of consumers′low-carbon strategies is negatively correlated with the cost of their low-carbon consumption,it is positively correlated with the low-carbon gains consumers receive from financial institutions.

关 键 词：碳减排 均衡策略 演化博弈 个人碳账户 前景理论 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]