供应商侵占行为对平台供应链防伪治理的影响研究  

Effects of Supplier Encroachment on Anti-counterfeiting Governance of Platform Supply Chains

作　　者：张子健 金天 ZHANG Zijian;JIN Tian(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《工业工程》2023年第5期19-28,共10页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(17BGL177)。

摘　　要：为了研究供应商侵占对在线平台销售中产品防伪治理造成的影响,通过建立Stackelberg博弈模型,分析线上平台防伪治理决策以及存在供应商侵占时的平台防伪治理决策,并进行对比分析。结果表明,存在一个佣金比例的取值区间,使得供应商侵占会促进平台防伪治理强度。建立防伪机制前后转售模式供应商和平台商的利润主要取决于假货渗透率、质量差异的双重限制下的影响;而供应商建立防伪机制的防伪可信度受到平台租金比例和供应商侵占中转售模式占市场比例的影响,且防伪可信度与平台佣金比例和转售模式所占比例都成反比。同时,选择建立防伪机制在一定条件下可以使供应链总利润提高。In order to study the impact of supplier encroachment on product anti-counterfeiting governance in online platform sales,a Stackelberg game model is established to analyze and compare the anti-counterfeiting governance decisions of online platforms with and without supplier encroachment.Results show that there exists a range of commission ratios such that supplier encroachment promotes the strength of anti-counterfeiting governance of a platform.In addition,the profits of resale mode suppliers and platform providers before and after the establishment of the anti-counterfeiting mechanism mainly depend on the influence of the penetration rate of counterfeit goods and the impact of quality differences.The anti-counterfeiting credibility of suppliers in establishing anti-counterfeiting mechanisms is affected by the ratio of platform rent and the proportion of resale modes in the market with supplier encroachment.Also,the anti-counterfeiting credibility is inversely proportional to the platform commission ratio and the proportion of the resale modes.Furthermore,choosing to establish an anti-counterfeiting mechanism can increase the total profit of a supply chain under certain conditions.

关 键 词：供应商侵占 线上平台 防伪治理 供应链 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]