法律的普遍服从何以可能——以博弈中的共同信念为视角  

Common Belief and the Rule of Law:Perspective from Game Theory

作　　者：黄竹鋆 HUANG ZhuJun(Law School,Nanjing University,210093)

机构地区：[1]南京大学法学院,南京市鼓楼区210093

出　　处：《制度经济学研究》2023年第2期58-84,共27页Research on Institutional Economics

摘　　要：法治首先意味着已成立的法律获得普遍的服从。信念决定了人们在博弈中的行为,因此法律得到普遍的服从只有在人们形成了服从法律的共同信念时才能实现。法治保证博弈的混合策略纳什均衡展示了何谓法律的普遍服从,以及这种状态的不稳定性。法律的普遍服从是一种基于人们服从法律的共同信念的行为秩序,其建立需要法律具备在博弈中创造聚点的能力,其不稳定性则要求实现对权力的有效约束以传递官员和民众协调行动的信号。法律的内容、形式及实施满足一定的条件将有助于法律创造聚点和约束权力,从而实现法律的普遍服从。法律的普遍服从何以可能的博弈论解答不仅更好地刻画了法治实践,还为整合经典的法治理论提供了框架,是一种对法治的融贯理解。The rule of law means,first and foremost,that enacted laws are actu-ally obeyed.Belief determines a player's behavior in the game,and actually obedi-ence to the law can only be achieved when players form a common belief that others will obey the law actually.The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the Rule of Law Assurance Game demonstrates what"actually obeyed"is and its potential instabili-ty."Actually obeyed"is a stable state of the common belief that requires the law to have the ability to create a focal point in the game,and its instability requires limits on power.The content,form,and implementation of the law meet certain condi-tions that will help the law to create a focal point and limit power.The game-theoret-ic answer to the question of how"actually obeyed"is possible not only provides a better picture of the practice of the rule of law but also provides a framework for in-tegrating the classical theory of the rule of law,which is a coherent understanding of the rule of law.

关 键 词：法律的普遍服从 法治 共同信念 聚点 约束权力 

分 类 号：F063.4[经济管理—政治经济学]