组织冗余、产权性质差异与企业过度投资  

Organizational Redundancy,Differences in Ownership,and Overinvestment of Enterprises

作　　者：黄俊荣[1] 高倩 HUANG Jun-rong;GAO Qian(School of Accounting,Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics,Urumqi 830001,China;Henan(Xinzheng)Provincial Tax Service,State Taxation Administration,Zhengzhou 410100,China)

机构地区：[1]新疆财经大学会计学院,乌鲁木齐830001 [2]国家税务总局新郑市税务局,郑州410100

出　　处：《重庆工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第6期86-97,共12页Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University：Social Science Edition

摘　　要：考察组织冗余的成因、分类及其对投资效率的影响,并从产权性质差异的视角进行进一步研究。通过实证研究发现:(1)非沉淀性冗余资源越多,管理层发生过度投资的可能性越大;(2)企业的沉淀冗余资源与管理层的过度投资无显著相关性;(3)相比于国有企业,非国有企业的非沉淀冗余资源越多,管理层发生过度投资行为的可能性越大;(4)相比于非国有企业,国有企业的沉淀性冗余资源越多,管理层发生过度投资行为的可能性越大。The causes and classification of organizational redundancy and the impact of organizational redundancy on investment efficiency were examined,and further research was conducted from the perspective of differences in ownership.Through empirical research,it is found that:(1)the more unabsorbed slack resources,the greater the possibility of overinvestment by the management;(2)there is no significant correlation between absorbed slack resources of enterprises and the possibility of overinvestment by the management;(3)compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises have more unabsorbed slack resources,and the management is more likely to overinvest;(4)compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the more absorbed slack resources in state-owned enterprises,the greater the likelihood of management overinvestment.

关 键 词：组织冗余 过度投资 产权性质 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F271