墨家逻辑中的两种“真”概念  

Two Kinds of Concepts of“Truth”in Mohist Logic

作　　者：杨武金[1] 何新宇 Yang Wujin;He Xinyu

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《中州学刊》2023年第11期124-131,共8页Academic Journal of Zhongzhou

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“墨学核心思想及其当代价值”(2021GS0110)。

摘　　要：墨家逻辑作为先秦时期墨子及其弟子所创立的重要思想,是中国逻辑思想的重要组成部分。凡承认墨家逻辑中有“真”概念的学者,都认为墨家的“当”“是”等词可作为符合论意义上的“真”语词;而不承认墨家逻辑中有“真”概念的学者,则多数认为墨家逻辑以论辩为目的,致使伦理价值特点过度卷入,从而使得墨家的“真”概念局限在语用上而非语义层面。事实上,这一观点仅表明墨家逻辑中的“真”概念并不仅止于符合论层面,而更体现着信念一贯性意义上的“真”,而这种“真”判断是依托于墨家“兼相爱,交相利”思想的融贯。无论是作为判断言辞标准的“三表法”中的“本”与“原”,还是墨家将“十论”作为言辞判断依据的特点,都在墨家的论证系统内部保持着一致的信念。由此观之,墨家逻辑中显然在符合论的基础上更存在着融贯论的“真”概念。As an important thought founded by Mozi and his disciples in the pre-Qin,Mohist logic is an important part of Chinese logic thought.Scholars who basically admit that there is the concept of“truth”in Mohist logic believe that Mohist words such as Dang and Shi can be used as“truth”words in the sense of correspondence theory,while most scholars who do not admit that there is the concept of“truth”in Mohist logic believe that because the purpose of Mohist logic is to demonstrate which leads to the excessive involvement of ethical value characteristics.The Mohist concept of“truth”is only limited to the pragmatic level rather than the semantic level.In fact,this kind of view only shows that the concept of“truth”in Mohist logic does not stop at the level of correspondence theory,but also reflects“truth”in the sense of consistency of belief,and this kind of“truth”judgment is based on the integration of Mohist ideas of“mutual love and mutual benefit”.Both Ben本and Yuan原in the“three standards”as the standard of judging rhetoric,and the characteristics of Mohist school taking the“ten theories”as the basis of judging rhetoric,maintain consistent beliefs within Mohist argumentation system.From this point of view,there is obviously the concept of“truth”based on coherence theory in Mohist logic.

关 键 词：墨家逻辑 真 符合论 融贯论 

分 类 号：B222[哲学宗教—中国哲学]