双渠道绿色供应链定价和信息共享策略研究  

Pricing Strategy and Information Sharing Strategy in Dual-channel Green Supply Chain

作　　者：林凯 王璐 陈丽华[1] LIN Kai;WANG Lu;CHEN Lihua(Guanghua School of Management,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2023年第5期161-172,共12页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71673011)。

摘　　要：从信号博弈的角度探讨制造商对定价顺序的决策以及不同情景下零售商的信息共享策略。研究发现:制造商让零售商先定价并不总会导致利润受损,因为信息不对称时制造商能以零售价为信号决策直销价;零售商在消费者绿色偏好较强或渠道间竞争强度较弱时愿意主动共享市场需求信息;制造商零售价滞后决策提升了绿色创新水平,但使其无法通过零售价推测市场需求信息,信息不对称对绿色创新的影响增大。零售商共享信息时零售价滞后策略会降低最优直销价格,而零售商不共享信息时制造商的零售价滞后策略使其只能根据期望决策直销价。The manufacturer's pricing order strategy and the retailer's information sharing strategy under different scenarios were discussed from the perspective of signal game. The result shows that letting the retailer set price first does not necessarily hurt profits of the manufacturer. Facing information asymmetry,the manufacturer can take the retail price as a signal to decide the direct selling price. The retailer is willing to share market demand information when consumers have a strong green preference or the competition between channels is weak. The lagging decision of the retail price stimulates green innovation but makes the manufacturer unable to infer market demand information through the price,which increases the impact of information asymmetry on green innovation. If the retailer shares information,the lagging decision will reduce the optimal direct selling price. If the retailer shares no information,the manufacturer can only decide the direct selling price based on its expectation.

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 绿色创新 信息不对称 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]