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作 者:杨振华 孙正捷 刘茹 郭鹏举 YANG Zhen-hua;SUN Zheng-jie;LIU Ru;GUO Peng-jun(School of Business,Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University,Nanchang 330036,China;School of Accounting,Southwestern University of Finance and Economic,Chengdu 610000,China;Systems Engineering Institute,Academy of Military Sciences,People’s Liberation Army,Beijing 100166,China)
机构地区:[1]江西科技师范大学商学院,江西南昌330036 [2]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都610000 [3]军事科学院系统工程研究院,北京100166
出 处:《中国管理科学》2023年第10期193-204,共12页Chinese Journal of Management Science
基 金:国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BSH015);江西省社会科学基金资助项目(22YJ09);江西省高校人文社会科学项目(JJ22115);江西省教育科学规划基金资助项目(21YB138)。
摘 要:为研究企业社会责任(corporate social responsibility,CSR)对技术授权以及企业产品定价的影响,本文构建了技术授权与产品分销两阶段动态博弈模型。通过模型求解,得到了技术提供商最优技术授权合同设计以及品牌制造商、零售商的最优产品定价决策,分析了品牌制造商承担SR对技术授权、产品分销以及消费者福利的影响。研究发现:品牌制造商承担SR不会影响技术提供商对技术授权合同形式的选择,其总是会选择固定收费形式的技术授权合同或者“版税提成+固定授权费”形式的技术授权合同;品牌制造商承担SR会导致产品批发价格、零售价格的降低和产品需求的增加,有利于提升零售商、供应链系统的利润水平和消费者福利;品牌制造商承担SR能激励企业让渡部分利润来提升消费者福利,但也会导致品牌制造商利润水平的降低;不对称信息会导致技术提供商的利润损失,但有利于品牌制造商获得额外信息租金。In the past ten years,our country has attached great importance to the protection of intellectual property rights and has issued a series of policies and measures to improve the level of intellectual property protection.Intellectual property rights protection is the cornerstone of the socialistic market economic.To strengthen the protection and application capacity of intellectual property as well as improve the creative awareness of science and technology are significant develop our national economy,and encourage scientific research.Patent licensing and authorization contracts are key to turning intellectual property into actual productivity.However,unreasonable licensing contracts can easily lead to the breakdown of technology licensing coopera⁃tion,which can lead to patent infringement disputes.In this context,the following prololems will be studied:how should a technology provider choose a reasonable technology licensing agreement?What impact will the corporate social responsibility preference have on technology licensing cooperation?And what is the impact of corporate social responsibility on product distribution and consumer welfare and other issues?Considering a sup⁃ply chain consisting of a technology provider,a branded manufacturer and a retailer,the technology license contracts designed by technology provider and the pricing strategies between the branded manufacturer and the retailer in the presence of corporate social responsibility preference and asymmetric information are investigated.The main work in this paper includes four parts.At first,the optimal licensing contract is proposed and the optimal pricing strategies under asymmetric information are analyzed.Second,on this basis,the effects of corporate social responsibility preference on the equilibrium are analyzed,and consequently the optimal pricing and contract design of supply chain members are compared under different types of market demand.Third,to address the value of corporate social responsibility,the changing of profit of supply chai
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