基于公平偏好理论的制造业工人激励机制研究  

Research on incentive mechanism of manufacturing workers based on fairness preference theory

作　　者：王冠 王朝 张鑫红 WANG Guan;WANG Zhao;ZHANG Xinhong(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Science and Technology,Shijiazhuang 050000,Hebei,China)

机构地区：[1]河北科技大学经济管理学院,河北石家庄050000

出　　处：《山东大学学报（理学版）》2023年第11期95-103,共9页Journal of Shandong University(Natural Science)

基　　金：教育部产学合作协同育人资助项目(202002024046);石家庄市科技局软科学资助项目(215790145A)。

摘　　要：在中小型制造型企业经理人和工人合作的基础上引入公平偏好理论,改进传统的委托-代理模型,设计不同公平偏好程度下工人的最优激励机制,并对模型进行数据模拟和算例分析。结果显示:双方不同的公平偏好程度会改变最优薪酬的分配方案,工人疲劳程度也会有明显差异;雇佣公平偏好程度较高的工人将会提高企业价值产出和经理人预期净收益。提出了对中小型制造型企业发展的建议,并对其薪酬分配问题提供借鉴。Based on the cooperation between managers and workers of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises,the fair preference theory is introduced and the traditional principal-agent model is improved.The optimal incentive mechanism for workers with different degrees of fair preference is designed.Data simulation and example analysis are carried out on the model.The results show that the different fairness preference of both parties changes the optimal salary distribution plan,and the fatigue level of workers is also significantly different;the employment of workers with higher fairness preference increases the value of the enterprise output and managersexpected net income.In this regard,suggestions for the development of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises are put forward,which can provide a reference for the salary distribution of domestic small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises.

关 键 词：疲劳程度 公平偏好 委托-代理 薪酬激励 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]