道德欺骗的透视与反思——基于列维纳斯道德哲学的分析  

Perspective and Reflection on Moral Deception——An Analysis Baced on Levinas'Moral Philosophy

作　　者：高继鑫 Gao Jixin(School of Philosophy,Renmin University of China,Beijing100872,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京京100872

出　　处：《晋阳学刊》2023年第6期95-102,共8页Academic Journal of Jinyang

基　　金：中国人民大学2022年度中央高校建设世界一流大学(学科)和特色发展引导专项资金项目“德国实证主义论争中的哲学方法论问题研究”。

摘　　要：道德欺骗是列维纳斯的道德哲学中尚未得到充分阐发的理论问题。列维纳斯对道德欺骗问题的研究涉及两种解释进路,即马克思主义的意识形态批判进路和神义论终结进路。马克思主义把道德理解为意识形态,揭示其自我宣称的普遍性带有欺骗色彩。列维纳斯提出了四种论据反驳这一观点,他倾向于把道德欺骗问题视作神义论终结的产物。他主张道德本身不是意识形态,并不具有欺骗性,道德奠基于他者的面容而非福利之上。列维纳斯的四种反驳和神义论终结的学说都是不成立的。他误解了道德欺骗问题的本质,而恰恰是马克思主义意识形态批判在道德哲学上具有优越性。The question of morality's deception in Levinas'moral philosophy has not been fully elucidated yet.There are two interpretive approaches involved in Levinas'research about the question of morality's decep-tion:the ideology critique approach of Marxism and the approach of the end of theodicy.Morality is considered as ideology in Marxism,which is revealed that its self-claimed universality is a deception.Levinas raises four argu-ments to refute it.Levinas refers this question to the consequence of the end of theodicy.He argues that morality is not ideology,and it is not deceptive.Morality is based on the face of the other rather than the welfare.The four arguments of Levinas and his doctrine of the end of theodicy are not true.He misunderstands the nature of the question of morality's deception.

关 键 词：列维纳斯 道德 欺骗 意识形态 神义论 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学] D2[政治法律—政治学]