独立董事-CEO友好性、业绩期望落差与公司创新  

Independent Director-CEO Friendliness,Performance below Historical Aspirations and Corporate Innovation

作　　者：罗肖依 周建[2] 王宇 Luo Xiaoyi;Zhou Jian;Wang Yu(School of Business,Beijing International Studies University;Business School,Nankai University,China Academy of Corporate Governance,Nankai University;School of Management,Lanzhou University)

机构地区：[1]北京第二外国语学院商学院 [2]南开大学商学院、南开大学中国公司治理研究院 [3]兰州大学管理学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2023年第4期168-179,I0032,I0033,共14页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72002091、71672008);北京第二外国语学院青年学术英才项目(21111000005)资助。

摘　　要：本文旨在探讨独立董事—CEO之间的友好性对公司长期性战略投资--公司创新的影响,以及业绩期望落差对独立董事—CEO友好性与公司创新之间关系的调节效应。基于注意力基础观及时间为基础的代理问题的核心思想,使用2011-2017年沪深A股上市公司的面板数据,运用随机效应的Tobit回归及混合的Possion回归,研究发现,独立董事—CEO之间的人口统计学特征友好性有助于提高公司创新投入水平(表现为研发密度的增加),以及创新绩效的改善(表现为发明专利申请数量的增加)。相反,独立董事—CEO之间的社会友好性会降低创新投入水平及创新绩效,这均在高科技企业样本中更为显著。在控制自选择引发的内生性问题之后,研究结果仍然得到支持。本文的研究表明,在中国“转型经济”的制度背景和“人情关系”的社会特征情境下,独立董事—CEO社会友好性会产生“友谊的成本”,加重高管在公司创新中的机会主义行为及时间短视。独立董事—CEO人口统计学特征友好性更有利于优化高管团队的注意力分配、缓解时间短视,促进董事会与高管团队在公司创新中的战略合作行为,进而提高公司创新投入水平及创新绩效。Innovation is crucial to the endogenous growth of a country’s economy,the survival of enterprises and the acquisition of long-term competitiveness.However,the opportunistic behavior and risk aversion characteristics of senior executives often lead to insufficient investment in innovation and ineffective allocation of innovation resources.Therefore,how to design the“optimal”cor-porate governance mechanism to alleviate the two types of agency problems in the long-term strategic investment decision-making of companies,that is innovation activities,is an important research topic faced by academic and practical areas.However,in recent years,the empirical research on the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and corporate innovation has not reached a consistent conclusion.The board of directors represents the highest level of the company’s decision-making control system and is the first line of defense to control and alleviate agency risks in innovation activities.The friendly relationship between individual independent directors and CEOs can enhance the friendliness of the board of directors,which can affect the strength and weakness of board of directors’super-vision,and then affect the behavior interaction between the board of directors and the top management team in company’s innovation activities.Based on this,this paper aims to explore the influence of independent director-CEO friendliness on corporate innovation,and the moderating effect of performance below historical aspiration on the relationship between independent director-CEO friend-liness and corporate innovation,so as to clarify the empirical results of“corporate governance mechanism and corporate innova-tion”,and understand the internal driving force for companies to achieve long-term sustainable growth.On the basis of the existing research,we further divide the friendliness between independent directors and CEO into“social friendliness”formed by alumni relationship and hometown relationship,and“demographic friendline

关 键 词：独立董事—CEO友好性 社会友好性 人口统计学特征友好性 业绩期望落差 创新投入 创新绩效 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F273.1[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51