高管薪酬契约与企业自主创新——基于中国航空装备制造企业的经验证据  

Executive Compensation Contracts and Enterprise Independent Innovation

作　　者：刘振[1] 尚智沛 LIU Zhen;SHANG Zhipei(School of Business,Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics,Zhengzhou 450046,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州航空工业管理学院商学院,河南郑州450046

出　　处：《管理工程师》2023年第5期31-39,共9页Management Engineer

基　　金：国家社会科学后期资助基金(21FGLB026);教育部人文社会科学项目(19YJA630048);航空科学基金项目(2018ZG55025);河南省软科学会计专项(232400412035)。

摘　　要：以中国航空装备制造企业在中国A股上市公司的数据,运用多元回归分析模型,从高管绝对薪酬和相对薪酬两个维度,考察了高管薪酬契约对企业自主创新的影响关系及其作用机制。实证结果显示:从高管绝对薪酬来看,高管货币薪酬和股权薪酬均能够促进企业自主创新;从高管相对薪酬来看,高管团队长期薪酬差距和总薪酬差距对企业自主创新具有促进作用,但其短期薪酬差距对企业自主创新具有抑制作用。研究结论不仅丰富和深化了现有高管薪酬与企业自主创新的相关研究内容,而且在提升中国航空装备制造企业自主创新方面,能够为企业高管薪酬契约的科学设计决策提供有益的借鉴与启示。Using data from China's aerospace equipment manufacturing companies listed on the A-share market,this study employs a multiple regression analysis model to examine the impact and mechanisms of executive compensation contracts on enterprise independent innovation from two dimensions:absolute executive compensation and relative executive compensation.Empirical results indicate that,in terms of absolute executive compensation,both monetary and equity compensation for executives can promote enterprise independent innovation.Regarding relative executive compensation,long-term compensation disparities among executive teams and total compensation disparities have a positive influence on enterprise independent innovation,while short-term compensation disparities exert a restraining effect.The research conclusions not only enrich and deepen the existing literature on the relationship between executive compensation and enterprise independent innovation but also provide valuable insights for the scientific design of executive compensation contracts in promoting independent innovation in Chin's aerospace equipment manufacturing enterprises.

关 键 词：高管货币薪酬 高管股权薪酬 高管薪酬差距 自主创新 

分 类 号：F244[经济管理—劳动经济]