基于委托代理理论的企业经理人薪酬激励机制研究  

Incentive Mechanism Research of Business ExecutiveBased on Principal-Agent Theory

作　　者：万姝懿 詹一虹[1] WAN Shu-yi;ZHAN Yi-hong(National Research Center of Cultural Industries,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079,Hubei,China)

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学国家文化产业研究中心,武汉430079

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第5期105-114,共10页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：2019年国家社会科学基金一般项目(19BGL039)。

摘　　要：从企业所有者和经理人自身效用函数角度出发,借助博弈与数理工具探析了不同信息状态下委托代理薪酬激励机制的最优均衡解及其相关影响因素。研究发现,在信息对称情形下,企业所有者可利用“强制合同”约束经理人行为决策,双方博弈均衡解达到帕累托最优;而在信息不对称情形下,企业所有者需提高最优激励强度,同时经理人最优努力程度有所下降,二者博弈均衡解将偏离帕累托最优状态。研究表明,解决企业委托代理问题,首先需对经理人实施有效监督以解决信息不对称问题,其次才是经理人激励机制设计。From the perspective of utility functions of business owners and executives,this paper analyzes the equilibrium solutions of principal-agent compensation incentive mechanism and their related influential factors under different information conditions by means of game theory and mathematical tools.According to the analysis,the business owner can restrict the executive’s decision-making behavior by the use of“forcing contract”under the asymmetric information,and the equilibrium solution of the game between business owner and executive reaches the Pareto Optimality.On the contrary,under the asymmetric information,however,business owner needs to improve the optimal incentive intensity,and the optimal effort level of business executive declines,which then makes the equilibrium solution deviate from Pareto Optimality.Therefore,it is suggested that solving the problem of information asymmetry with effective supervision of business executives should come first to deal with the principal-agent problem,and then the incentive mechanism of the executive be designed.

关 键 词：委托代理 效用函数 激励机制 博弈均衡解 帕累托最优 

分 类 号：F272.923[经济管理—企业管理]