考虑公平关切的双渠道绿色供应链定价与政府补贴机制  

Pricing Strategy and Government Subsidy Mechanism in a Dual-channel Green Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns

作　　者：吴成锋[1] 赵秋红[2] 李建国 WU Cheng-feng;ZHAO Qiu-hong;LI Jian-guo(College of Economics and Management,Qingdao University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266061;School of Economics and Management,Beihang University,Beijing 100083)

机构地区：[1]青岛科技大学经济与管理学院,山东青岛266061 [2]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《软科学》2023年第11期138-144,共7页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72021001、72174019);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2020MG008);山东省人文社会科学课题(2022-JCGL-03);青岛市社会科学规划研究项目(QDSKL2201225);青岛科技大学社会科学基金项目(22XA01)。

摘　　要：以单个制造商和单个零售商构成的双渠道绿色供应链为研究对象,在统一零售价格策略下,考虑零售商公平关切行为,探究无政府补贴、绿色技术研发成本补贴和绿色度补贴三种情形对双渠道绿色供应链成员决策的影响。结果表明:(1)零售商的公平关切行为对三种模型下的双渠道绿色供应链的运营决策和成员收益的影响完全一致;(2)政府补贴强度的增加均能提高产品绿色度、制造商的利润和消费者剩余,而零售商不存在“搭便车”行为;(3)当政府补贴支出总额度较小时,绿色技术研发成本的补贴机制优于绿色度补贴机制。The paper takes the dual-channel green supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and retailer as the research object.Under the equal retail price strategy,considering the retail’s fairness concern behavior,the paper explores the influence of the three situations of non-government subsidy,green technology R&D cost subsidy,and green degree subsidy on the decision-making of the dual-channel green supply chain members.The results show that:(1)the retailer’s fairness concern behavior has the same effect on the operation decision-making and the members’profits of the dual channel green supply chain under the three models;(2)the increase of government subsidy intensity can improve the product green degree,the manufacturer’s profit,and consumer surplus,while the retailer does not have“free riding”behavior;(3)when the total amount of government subsidy expenditure is small,the subsidy mechanism of green technology R&D cost is better than the green degree subsidy mechanism.

关 键 词：双渠道绿色供应链 公平关切 政府补贴 统一零售定价策略 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] X196[经济管理—国民经济]