碳交易机制下政府与重污染企业碳减排演化博弈分析  

Carbon emission reduction between government and heavily polluting enterprises under carbon trading mechanism based on evolutionary game analysis

作　　者：杨霞[1,2] 何刚 吴传良[2,3] 王晓东 YANG Xia;HE Gang;WU Chuanliang;WANG Xiaodong(School of Economics and Management,Anhui University of Science&Technology,Huainan 232001,Anhui,China;School of Economics and Management,Huainan Normal University,Huainan 232038,Anhui,China;College of Business,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽理工大学经济与管理学院,安徽淮南232001 [2]淮南师范学院经济与管理学院,安徽淮南232038 [3]上海财经大学商学院,上海200433

出　　处：《安全与环境学报》2023年第11期4097-4107,共11页Journal of Safety and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71704002);2021年度安徽高校人文社会科学研究项目(SK2021A0543);2020年安徽省“三全育人”试点省建设暨高校思想政治能力提升项目(sztsjh 2020149);淮南师范学院2021年度校级科学研究项目(2021XJYB007)。

摘　　要：为探寻碳交易机制下重污染企业碳减排影响因素,研究政府和重污染企业博弈互动机理,以公众和企业意愿为约束,引入碳交易、碳补贴及碳惩罚手段,构建政府与重污染企业演化博弈理论模型,确定不同情形下的系统稳定演化策略,并选取相关数据模拟仿真。研究表明:(1)碳惩罚、碳补贴和碳交易规制手段组合使用为最优监管策略,碳交易机制通过碳交易收入可有效抑制成本因素的负向作用,促进双方积极参与碳减排;(2)受交易价格和碳配额联动影响的碳交易收入,突破一定阈值对博弈双方起正向作用,但存在波动效应;(3)政府和重污染企业碳减排演化博弈系统受双方初始策略比例、成本收益、公众意愿、企业意愿和碳交易市场作用共同驱动,尤其是企业对政府的意愿约束作用显著,可有效推动博弈双方采取积极行为。Based on the willingness of the public and enterprise,this paper constructed a government and heavily polluting enterprises evolutionary game theory model for exploring factors influencing carbon emission reduction of heavily polluting enterprises under the carbon trading mechanism and studying the game interaction mechanism between government and heavy polluting enterprises.In this process,we introduced three government low-carbon regulatory means,namely,carbon trading,carbon subsidies,and carbon penalties.Under this condition,this paper first determined the stabilization strategy of the system under different scenarios by calculating the replication dynamic equations and Jacobi matrices between them.Then,we selected the relevant data from the national carbon emission trading pilot areas for numerical simulation by using MATLAB software.Results show that first of all the carbon reduction efficiency of heavily polluting enterprises is improved by combining governmental low-carbon regulatory instruments.Among them,the combination of carbon penalties,carbon subsidies,and carbon trading is the optimal regulatory strategy,followed by the combination of carbon penalties and carbon subsidies.And heavily polluting enterprises will quickly tend to negative carbon emission reduction without considering any low carbon regulation means and relying only on market regulation,which cannot promote the realization of carbon emission reduction goals.In addition,as an important influencing factor in the carbon trading mechanism,carbon trading revenue can effectively suppress the negative effect of cost factors and realize the purpose of the carbon trading mechanism to promote the active participation of both government and heavily polluting enterprises in carbon emission reduction.Moreover,it is found that carbon trading revenue is easily influenced by the price and carbon quota linkage,and breaking a certain threshold which has a positive effect on both sides of the game,but there is a fluctuation effect.Last but not least,the ev

关 键 词：环境学 碳交易 碳减排 重污染企业 演化博弈 意愿约束 

分 类 号：X24[环境科学与工程—环境科学]