基于相对业绩评价的EPC模式下分包商激励机制研究  

Incentive Mechanism for Subcontractors under EPC Mode Based on Relative Performance Evaluation

作　　者：罗运宝 刘春丽 孙春玲[2] LUO Yunbao;LIU Chunli;SUN Chunling(CHN Energy International Engineering Consulting Co.,Ltd.,Beijing 100011,China;School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300384,China)

机构地区：[1]国家能源集团国际工程咨询有限公司,北京100011 [2]天津理工大学管理学院,天津300384

出　　处：《建筑设计管理》2023年第9期28-34,共7页Architectural Design Management

摘　　要：以EPC总承包商与分包商间的委托代理问题为切入点,分析二者之间的激励困境;通过分析总承包商与分包商之间信息不对称的问题,建立相对业绩评价体系,并明确评价指标、权重以及计算方法;最后通过将相对业绩评价引入分包合同以及建立分包商资源库来构建激励机制。通过相对业绩评价方法,能客观准确地评价分包商的行为,进而给予激励与惩罚。Taking the principal-agent problem between the EPC general contractor and subcontractors as the starting point,the article analyzes the incentive dilemma between the two;By analyzing the issue of information asymmetry between the general contractor and subcontractors,it establishes a relative performance evaluation system,and clarifies evaluation indicators,weights,and calculation methods;Finally,the incentive mechanism is constructed by introducing relative performance evaluation into subcontracting contracts and establishing a subcontractor resource library.By using relative performance evaluation methods,the behavior of subcontractors can be objectively and accurately evaluated,and then incentives and punishments can be given.

关 键 词：EPC模式 激励机制 相对业绩评价 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]