想象力习惯、推理副词与归纳的客观化条件——对绿蓝悖论解决方案的评析和推进  

Imagination Habits,Reasoning Adverbs and Objectifying Conditions of Induction:A Review and Advancement of the Solution to the Grue Problem

作　　者：卢峰峰 陈嘉明 LU Fengfeng;CHEN Jiaming(Department of Philosophy,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai,200092)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学哲学系,上海200092

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2023年第12期30-39,共10页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：绿蓝悖论指经验同一且逻辑等价的证据陈述可以归纳地支持逻辑冲突的假设陈述,它本质上是一种直觉混乱而非逻辑悖论。单一偏好直觉与同等偏好直觉的冲突,其解决仍依赖对休谟遗留的“想象力习惯”思想的澄清。既有的非对称性解决方案对“想象力习惯条件句”附加了新的心理习惯,通过解释单一偏好直觉来避免假设冲突。借助互补性原理实现的完全对称性解决方案则肯定了同等偏好直觉,并且化解了假设冲突。这一推进是基于从归纳直觉的概念反思到归纳副词的语言分析的方法论改进之上的。归纳推理副词的意义包含必然性运算的逻辑形式和客观化条件的语义内容,它刻画了想象力习惯的一般结构。The Grue Problem means that the empirically identical and logically equivalent statements of evidence can inductively support the logically conflicting statements of hypotheses,which is essentially an intuition confusion rather than a logic paradox.The resolution of the conflict between single preference intuition and equal preference intuition relies on the clarification of Hume’s“imagination habit”.The existing asymmetrical solution attaches new mental habits to the“conditional sentence of imaginative habit”,avoiding hypothetical conflicts by explaining the single preference intuition.The symmetry solution which is achieved through the complementarity principle affirms the equal preference intuition and resolves the conflicts of hypotheses.The advancement is attributed to the methodological improvement made from the conceptual reflection on inductive intuitions to the language analysis of inductive adverbs.The meaning of induction of reasoning adverbs contains the logical form of necessity operation and the semantic content of objectifying condition,a portrayal of the general structure of imagination habits.

关 键 词：绿蓝悖论 想象力习惯 推理副词 客观化条件 互补性原理 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]