基于营销力度的电商供应链信号传递策略  

Signaling Strategy of E-commerce Supply Chain Based on Marketing Efforts

作　　者：陈兆波 申珍贞[2] 刘斌 CHEN Zhaobo;SHEN Zhenzhen;LIU Bin(Research Center for Innovation and Development of Equipment Manufacturing Industry,Taiyuan University of Science and Technology,Taiyuan 030024,China;School of Economics and Management,Taiyuan University of Science and Technology,Taiyuan 030024,China;China Lucky Film Corporation,Baoding 071054,China)

机构地区：[1]太原科技大学装备制造业创新发展研究中心,山西太原030024 [2]太原科技大学经济与管理学院,山西太原030024 [3]中国乐凯集团有限公司,河北保定071054

出　　处：《物流科技》2024年第1期147-152,157,共7页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(19GBL259);太原科技大学研究生教育创新项目(SY2022069)。

摘　　要：在市场需求信息不对称背景下,针对由一个供应商和一个电商平台组成的供应链系统,构建了电商平台利用营销力度间接传递需求信息的信号博弈模型。分别讨论了分离均衡及混同均衡下供应链各成员的决策及利润。在此基础上,进一步利用“直观标准”分析了电商平台营销力度的选择策略及其影响因素。研究发现:当市场需求波动程度较大时,电商平台会选择分离均衡;当市场需求波动程度较小且电商平台边际营销成本差异较小时,电商平台会选择混同均衡。除此之外,平台使用费比例、供应商先验信念也是影响平台决策的重要因素。In the context of asymmetric market demand information,a signaling game model is constructed for a supply chain system consisting of a supplier and an e-commerce platform,in which the e-commerce platform uses marketing efforts to indirectly transmit demand information.The decisions and profits of each member of the supply chain are discussed in separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium,respectively.On this basis,the marketing strategy of e-commerce platform and its influencing factors are further analyzed by using"intuitive criteria".The results show that when the market demand fluctuates greatly,the e-commerce platform will choose the separating equilibrium;when the market demand fluctuates less and the marginal marketing cost difference of the e-commerce platform is smaller,the e-commerce platform will choose the pooling equilibrium.Additionally,the ratio of platform usage fee and supplier'a priori belief are also important factors that influence the decision of e-commerce platform.

关 键 词：代理销售模式 营销力度 信息不对称 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]