考虑收益共享契约的绿色供应链协调策略研究  

Research on Coordination Strategy of Green Supply Chain Considering Revenue Sharing Contract

作　　者：胡永仕 孙金凯 林晶[2] HU Yongshi;SUN Jinkai;LIN Jing(School of Transportation,Fujian University of Technology,Fuzhou 350118,China;不详)

机构地区：[1]福建理工大学交通运输学院,福建福州350118 [2]福建江夏学院数理部,福建福州350108

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2023年第6期920-927,共8页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：福建省社科联重点项目(FJ2022A010);福建省自然科学基金项目(2023J011102).

摘　　要：绿色制造水平已成为衡量国家制造业竞争力的重要因素。在制造商、零售商和消费者组成的两条绿色供应链中,为研究收益共享契约对链内纵向合作与链间横向竞争的影响,构建了Stackelberg主从动态博弈模型,分别确定两条供应链是否达成收益共享契约3种情形下的产品最优绿色水平及定价决策,分析产品竞争强度和消费者绿色敏感度对供应链均衡结果及收益共享契约优势效应的影响。研究表明:在价格和绿色度的双重竞争下,产品绿色水平随竞争强度的增强而提高。当消费者绿色敏感度较低时,提高产品绿色度可使制造商从中获益;随着产品竞争强度或消费者绿色敏感度的增强,若竞争供应链未达成收益共享契约,则实行收益共享的供应链中的制造商可获得帕累托改善,并且较小的共享系数使得零售商也获得帕累托改善。The level of green manufacturing has become an important factor to assess the competitiveness of national manufacturing industries.To study the effects of revenue sharing contracts on intra-chain vertical cooperation and inter-chain horizontal competition,a Stackelberg master-slave dynamic game model is constructed in two green supply chains consisting of manufacturers,retailers and consumers to determine the optimal green level of products and pricing decisions under three scenarios of whether the two supply chains reach revenue sharing contract or not.The influence of product competition intensity and consumer green sensitivity on supply chain equilibrium results and the advantage effect of revenue sharing contract is analyzed.The study shows that under the dual competition of price and green degree,the green level of the product increases with the intensity of competition.When consumer green sensitivity is low,increasing product greenness can benefit manufacturers.As product competitiveness or consumer green sensitivity increases,if the competing supply chains do not reach revenue sharing contracts,the manufacturer in the supply chain with revenue sharing can obtain Pareto improvement,and the smaller sharing coefficients allow retailers to obtain Pareto improvements as well.

关 键 词：竞争供应链 收益共享 绿色度 竞争强度 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]