费尔巴哈对莱布尼茨本体论的批判与反思  

Feuerbach’s Critique and Reflection on Leibniz’s Ontology

作　　者：张锦浩 Zhang Jinhao(College of Marxism,Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou 450046)

机构地区：[1]河南财经政法大学马克思主义学院,郑州450000

出　　处：《西部学刊》2024年第2期161-164,共4页Journal of Western

摘　　要：费尔巴哈将莱布尼茨本体论特征分成两大问题进行探讨,分别为“本体本质性质与现象表现的关系问题”与“本体的一般性质与特殊性质的关系问题”。费尔巴哈指出了莱布尼茨探讨精神实体本质与现象的关系时,片面夸大本体物质的感性性质,强调感性直观,忽视精神的能动作用。费尔巴哈也批判了莱布尼茨本体论中关于“一般”与“个别”之间的联系,他将物质的一般共性与特殊个性都归结于感性存在的本体本身,取消了莱布尼茨精神单子为生成万物的本体观。马克思评价费尔巴哈轻视抽象思维而重视感性直观,但他并没有将感性看做实践的、人的感性的活动。在批判莱布尼茨的本体论中,费尔巴哈陷入了与莱布尼茨同样的局限中。Feuerbach divided the characteristics of Leibniz's ontology into two major issues for discussion,namely"the relationship between the essential nature of ontology"and"the manifestation of phenomena andthe relationship between the general nature and special nature of ontology".Feuerbach pointed out that when Leibniz explored the relationship between the essence of the spiritual entity and the phenomenon,he exaggerated the sensibility of the ontological substance,emphasized perceptual intuition,and neglected the dynamic role of the spirit.Feuerbach also criticized the connection between"general"and"individual"in Leibniz's ontology,and he attributed the general and special characteristics of matter to the ontology of sensual existence itself,canceling Leibniz's ontological view of the mental monad as the generator of all things.Marx commented that Feuerbach emphasized abstract thinking over perceptual intuition,but he did not view perception as a practical,human perceptual activity.Therefore,in criticizing Leibniz’s ontology,Feuerbach fell into the same limitations as Leibniz.

关 键 词：莱布尼茨 费尔巴哈 本体论 感性直观 

分 类 号：B504[哲学宗教—外国哲学]